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January 4, 2017 
Abstract 
We test two complementary theories of optimal trading strategies by analyzing transaction 
patterns of corporate insiders: Information-based theories predict that investors trade faster if 
they compete with others for exploiting the same information. Liquidity-based theories pre-
dict the opposite. Our analysis supports the predictions of liquidity-based models: insiders 
take longer to complete trades when they face competition from other insiders and they trade 
slower in less liquid markets. Insiders adapt to fluctuations in market liquidity. We identify 
informed trading using CARs, company news announcements, and insider trading pattern. 
Our results support the predictions of information-based models for trades classified as in-
formed. 
JEL classifications: G14, G34, G38 
Keywords: Trade splitting, informed trading, block trading, insider trading, liquidity, Sar-
banes-Oxley 
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1 Introduction 
This paper evaluates theories of strategic trading, defined as the way in which investors break up 
large trades and allocate them over time. The literature has produced a range of models, which 
can be grouped according to the main motivation for strategic trading. The first group assumes 
that informed investors spread their trades over time in order to conceal their private information 
and manage the permanent price impact their trades have on the stock price, an argument that 
goes back at least to Kyle (1985).
1
 The second group is based on trading motives that comprise 
portfolio-rebalancing and risk-sharing, which we summarize under the broad concept of liquidity 
motives (“allocational” motives in Vayanos (2001)). These theories share the notion that inves-
tors manage the temporary price impact their trades have on stock prices, a friction which may 
exist absent any informational motivations for trading, and which creates a cost for immediate 
execution and a trade-off between immediacy and the price at which an order is executed. To the 




The empirical literature in market microstructure has evaluated some of the specific impli-
cations of these models, but always has to face two empirical challenges, which we attempt to 
address in this paper. The first challenge is that large transaction databases do not provide identi-
                                                          
1
 While many authors have expanded on Kyle’s original analysis, very few have taken up its dynamic aspect and 
analyze strategies for how traders with private information break up their trades over time. The most important 
extensions for our purposes are Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994), Foster and Viswanathan (1994, 1996), and 
Back, Cao and Willard (2000), who consider multiple competing traders. We discuss their models in more detail 
below. 
2
 Grossman and Miller (1988) provide an early analysis of temporary price impact, but their model is not dynamic. 
Bertsimas and Lo (1998) have a model of dynamic trading, but assume a price process that only features perma-
nent price impact, which is more consistent with information-based trading. Other approaches include Almgren 
(2003), Almgren and Chriss (2001), He and Mamaysky (2005), Obizhaeva and Wang (2005), Huberman and 
Stanzl (2005), and Schied and Schöneborn (2009), who involve temporary price impact, but assume that the price 
process is exogenous to the investor’s trades. Vayanos (1999) derives prices and price impact endogenously from 
the model. 
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fiers for the investors who originated these transactions, so that direct analyses of trading strate-
gies rely on small, hand-collected data sets (see Chan and Lakonishok (1995) and Keim and 
Madhavan (1995), who have data from 37, respectively, 21 institutions). We address this problem 
by investigating insider trades, for which large comprehensive data sets exist. 
Second, models of strategic trading based on information-related motives and those based 
on liquidity-related motives often overlap in their predictions, making it difficult to distinguish 
them empirically. The reason is that investors will attempt to minimize temporary as well as per-
manent price impact independently of their trading motives. The focus of our analysis is on situa-
tions in which several investors trade simultaneously and therefore compete for the use of the 
same information, respectively, for liquidity in the same stock. In this particular context, theories 
of trading strategies generate distinct predictions depending on the main friction on which they 
are based. Information-based theories predict that competition among multiple informed investors 
leads to a “rat-race” effect, in which each informed investor trades faster. Intuitively, informed 
investors become competitors for the exploitation of the same informative signal and enjoy an 
informational advantage only as long as their information has not been incorporated into prices 
through the trades of other informed traders.
3
 This happens, because informed insiders’ trades 
move prices closer towards their fundamental values, so the trades of one insider impose a cost 
for waiting on all other insiders. By contrast, liquidity-based arguments imply the opposite: trad-
ers extend their trading horizons and trade more slowly if they know that other investors trade in 
the same direction at the same time, because competition for liquidity increases price impact and 
                                                          
3
 See also Foster and Viswanathan (1994, 1996), who investigate the case in which the signals of two competing 
insiders are not perfectly correlated. Then the prediction mentioned above holds only for the common component 
of insiders’ signals. Back, Cao and Willard (2000) show that the “rat-race” effect obtains only if the signals of 
different insiders are sufficiently correlated. Important extensions of this framework allow for the possibility that 
information is disclosed (Huddart, Hughes and Levine (2001)) and that it becomes stale (Bernhardt and Miao 
(2004)). 
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therefore the costs of immediacy. This happens even in anonymous markets when liquidity-
motivated trades have permanent price impact, because the market cannot distinguish between 
informed and uninformed trades. With liquidity-induced insider trades, price impact moves prices 
away from fundamental values and creates benefits from waiting and holding out until some 
point in the future when the market has learned the true information content of trades and prices 
have reverted to fundamental values. 
We study a sample of 1.85 million transactions by more than 99,000 insiders in the United 
States. Insiders’ trades provide an ideal testing ground for both groups of models, because insider 
transactions are well documented, permit the identification of multiple transactions by the same 
trader, and allow us to separate situations in which other insiders compete from situations in 
which only one insider trades. 
In the first step, we show that most of these transactions indeed form sequences that result 
from breaking up larger trades and not just from random clustering of transactions. The main 
analysis focuses on the length of transaction sequences in terms of calendar time (trade duration), 
measured in days. We ignore how trades are distributed within a day for data reasons, which also 
helps us to avoid looking at trades broken up passively during the day; such a passive break-up 
may result if insiders place limit orders that are matched with multiple orders from other traders.
4
 
We use three different identification strategies to separate trades into informed trades and unin-
formed trades: (1) corporate news events (e.g., M&A and earnings announcements); (2) event-
study returns after the disclosure of insider trades; (3) the classification of trades into opportunis-
tic and routine trades proposed by Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski (2012). We then distinguish days 
                                                          
4
  For an analysis of how insiders use market orders or limit orders see Baruch, Panayides and Venkataraman 
(2013). 
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on which multiple insiders of the same firm trade in the same direction from those days on which 
only one insider trades. 
Our main finding is that insiders trade more slowly and break up trades into longer se-
quences whenever multiple insiders trade at the same time, which is consistent with the predic-
tions of liquidity-based models of strategic trading. Hence, the predominant concern of insiders 
in our sample is the management of temporary price impact and market liquidity. This conclusion 
is also supported by four later analyses. First, we show that those insiders who are arguably least 
informed, because they have no operational role in the firm, take the longest to complete their 
trades. Second, if insiders trade on the long side of the market, i.e. they buy when the market 
moves up or sell when the market moves down, then they take longer to complete their trades. 
Third, trade duration increases in less liquid markets, independently of the measure we chose to 
proxy for market liquidity. Fourth, we investigate how insiders adapt their trading strategies in 
response to changes in the liquidity of their firm’s stock. We hypothesize that insiders respond to 
changes in market liquidity by avoiding low-liquidity days and trading more on days on which 
liquidity is high. We find strong evidence for this liquidity-timing hypothesis. Several liquidity 
measures increase by a factor of about two on days when insiders do not trade compared to days 
when they trade. All observations taken together support the conclusion that liquidity-related mo-
tives such as portfolio rebalancing or risk sharing are the predominant concern for most insiders. 
However, conclusions at the level of the entire sample may hide important differences 
across transactions. In most cases, we find trades are completed faster if insiders are more likely 
to be informed. More importantly, competition from other insiders reduces trade duration for in-
formed trades for all classifications of informed trades. This result is in line with the predictions 
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of the information-based models of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), Foster and Viswanathan 
(1994, 1996), Back, Cao and Willard (2000), and Kaniel and Liu (2006).  
We contribute to the literature in several ways. To the best of our knowledge, we are the 
first to conduct empirical tests for the contrasting implications of information-based and liquidi-
ty-based strategic trading models. The paper closest to ours is Cho (2007), who uses structural 
estimation of several information-based models and makes inferences about the number of in-
formed traders before earnings announcements. His inferences are based on matching moments 
for price volatility, volume, and market depth. His framework does not consider liquidity-based 
motivations for trading. In his experimental work, Schnitzlein (2002) shows that it may be critical 
for the predictions of information-based models that informed traders and dealers know how 
many informed traders are in the market. Cho (2007) and Schnitzlein (2002) are the only contri-
butions we are aware of that explicitly focus on competition between traders, and both have a dif-
ferent focus and use methodologies different from ours. 
There is a small empirical literature on trading strategies. Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2015) 
analyze the trading strategy of activist investors (Schedule 13D filers) and document liquidity 
timing, which is consistent with our evidence on corporate insiders. They conclude that strategic 
traders with long-lived information who can choose when and how to trade cannot be detected 
using standard adverse selection measures. Kacperczyk and Pagnotta (2016) examine options and 
equity market trades based on material and non-public information in SEC's insider trading litiga-
tion files. They argue in contrast to Collin-Dufrense and Fos (2015) that how information is re-
vealed to markets does not depend on whether informed traders strategically time their trades or 
not. Kaniel and Liu (2006) investigate in their empirical analysis the strategic choice of limit and 
market orders by informed investors. They find that limit orders are more informative than 
 - 6 - 
market orders. Baruch, Panayides and Venkataraman (2016) analyze the trading strategies of cor-
porate insiders before unscheduled news events. They relate the competition between insiders to 
the question of whether insiders use limit orders or market orders and hence to another aspect of 
insiders’ trading strategies than the one analyzed in this paper. 
2 Construction of the data set and methodology 
According to Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, all insiders have to disclose 
their transactions to the SEC. Insiders are direct and indirect beneficial owners of more than ten 
percent of any class of equity securities and any director or officer of the issuer of equity securi-
ties (Section 16(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SEC rule 16a-2). Until August 
2002, insiders had to report their transactions on a monthly basis within 10 days after the end of 
each calendar month in which the transaction occurred (Form 4), which gave insiders up to forty 
days to disclose their trades. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) changed this practice. Since August 
29, 2002, insiders had to report their trades within two business days (SEC rule 16a-3(g)). Small 
purchases or sales that do not add up to more than $10,000 within six months are exempt from 
these reporting requirements (SEC rule 16a-6). These small acquisitions are not reported on Form 
4 as usual insider transactions, but on Form 5, which has to be filed only within 45 days after the 
issuer's fiscal year end (SEC rule 16a-3(f)). 
2.1 Construction of the data set 
Our data source for insider transactions is the Insider Filing Data Feed (IFDF) provided by 
Thomson Reuters. IFDF collects information on three forms insiders have to file with the SEC: 
Form 3 (“Initial Statement of Beneficial Ownership of Securities”), Form 4 (“Statement of 
Changes of Beneficial Ownership of Securities”), and Form 5 (“Annual Statement of Beneficial 
Ownership of Securities”). We include all open market purchases and sales as well as private 
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transactions between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 2008 with complete data (including 
CUSIP, transaction date, and disclosure date) on IFDF. 
Table 1 provides the details of the construction of our data set. We extract 3,272,073 trans-
actions for 151,523 insiders from 18,380 firms. We match the transactions to CRSP and lose 
9.2% of the transactions because the firm is not listed on CRSP. We calculate abnormal returns 
from a market model, for which we require at least 100 stock return observations. We lose anoth-
er 9.1% because the stock price data available on CRSP are insufficient to compute abnormal re-
turns. We also delete all transactions for which the number of shares in the transaction as reported 
on IFDF exceeds the number of shares traded on the exchange on the same day as reported by 
CRSP; these transactions form 3.9% of the original sample and are most likely privately negoti-
ated and therefore not of interest for our analysis. We have a small number of cases in which in-
siders trade in different directions on the same day (0.8% of the original sample) and for which 
the transaction data on IFDF are incomplete (0.3%). We delete these transactions. We are con-
cerned that computer-executed trades may influence our analysis. We therefore exclude transac-
tions for which the number of shares traded is not a multiple of ten, which are most likely initiat-
ed by computerized algorithms. These odd-numbered trades form 14.4% of our original sample. 
Excluding them probably biases our results against liquidity-based theories because trading in 
multiples of 500, 1000, or 5000 shares has been associated with stealth trading (Alexander and 
Peterson (2007)), but we find that our results remain unaffected by excluding odd-numbered 
trades. One remaining concern is that some transactions are generated passively by matching 
large limit orders with several orders of other investors. To alleviate this concern we aggregate all 
transactions executed at the same price in the same direction by the same insider on the same day. 
In unreported regressions, we check whether our results are affected by the choice of this or sev-
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eral other aggregation rules and find that they have no impact on the results. We are left with 
1,849,513 transactions by 99,413 insiders of 11,013 firms, or 56.5% of the raw data. Of these 
20.3% are purchases and 79.7% are sales. 
For all microstructure variables, we use the TAQ database to extract the necessary intraday 
transaction data. For each trade we assign the bid and ask quotes prevailing one second before the 
trade took place. Henker and Wang (2006) consider this procedure to be more appropriate com-
pared to the classical Lee and Ready (1991) five-second rule. Bessembinder (2003) tries zero- to 
thirty-second delays in increments of five seconds and does not find any differences in the re-
sults. 
2.2 Constructing transaction sequences 
Definition of a transaction sequence. In our baseline analysis, we regard an individual transac-
tion as a part of a transaction sequence if there is a subsequent (individual) transaction in the 
same direction and by the same insider within seven days. If two transactions in the same direc-
tion are separated by a transaction in the opposite direction, we start a new sequence.
5
 Transac-
tion sequences are the main objects of our analysis; defining a transaction sequence properly is 
therefore crucial and we undertake a number of robustness checks. First, we vary the length of 
the trading window from three to 14 days. Second, we use a definition based on the actual disclo-
sure date of trades. In this case, a sequence stops if its first transaction is disclosed. The motiva-
tion for the latter definition is that trade splitting might only help insiders to conceal information 
as long as the first transaction in a sequence has not been disclosed. Betzer, Gider, Metzger and 
Theissen (2014) analyze the trade reporting of insiders before and after SOX. They find that be-
                                                          
5
  This choice may appear problematic in the context of the model of Huddart, Hughes and Levine (2001), in which 
insiders play mixed strategies and may interrupt a sequence of transactions in the same direction with a transac-
tion in the opposite direction to mislead the market. However, we find only 121 cases in which insiders change 
the direction of their trades within a week and conclude that this theoretical possibility is not relevant for our 
analysis. 
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fore SOX insiders frequently delayed reporting and even violated reporting requirements. Based 
on their event study results they argue that insiders who execute several trades before reporting 
are more likely to possess private information. 
As noted above, disclosure requirements changed with the Sarbanes-Oxley act (SOX) on 
August 29, 2002 and the definition is adjusted accordingly. Using our baseline definition based 
on seven-day sequences, we obtain 207,414 transaction sequences. Finally, we exclude 10,713 
sequences from our analysis where transactions across several days are executed at the same 
price, because these might be generated passively by matching large limit orders with several or-
ders of other investors. Not excluding these sequences does not materially affect our results. 
For all variables that can change over a transaction sequence, we assign the value of the 
variable associated with the first transaction to the whole sequence. We aggregate only Stake, de-
fined as the number of shares traded by the insider scaled by the number of shares outstanding, 
and Volume, value of the transaction in $, over transaction sequences. We refer to a transaction as 
a single transaction if it does not belong to any sequence. Overall, the 1,849,513 insider transac-
tions in our data set map into 455,484 trades. We identify 258,783 single transactions and 
196,701 transaction sequences. 
Figure 1 displays some characteristics of transaction sequences according to our benchmark 
definition. Panel A of Figure 1 shows a secular trend throughout our sample period towards more 
transaction sequences, which account for about 60% of all trades at the beginning of our sample 
period and for 95% before the onset of the financial crisis, which then led to a considerable drop 
in transaction sequences. Panel B of Figure 1 displays the number of transactions per sequence, 
which shows a similar pattern. There are about two transactions per sequence in 1996; the num-
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ber increases steadily to about twelve transactions per sequence. The financial crisis caused a 
dramatic drop in the number of transactions per sequence. 
Definition of trade duration. The trade duration of transaction sequences is defined as the 
weighted number of days between the first and the last transaction of the sequence, where the 
weights are the number of shares traded in sequence s on date t: 






s t s t
t t
Trade Duration s  t SharesTraded SharesTraded  
This definition takes into account not only the number of days between the beginning and the end 
of the transaction sequence but also the number of shares traded on each day. Under this defini-
tion, trade duration decreases if the insider trades larger volumes during the first days of the se-
quence compared to situations when the insider splits her transactions equally throughout the se-
quence. The trade duration of a single transaction is equal to one. Given our definitions and sam-
ple construction, transaction sequences that are completed within one day also have a trade dura-
tion equal to one. Panel C of Figure 1 plots average trade duration, which increases from about 
1.8 to 2.2 days in the period before Sarbanes-Oxley. After Sarbanes-Oxley, trade duration contin-
uously decreases to 1.4 days until 2007. During the financial crisis of 2008, trade duration in-
creases again to about 1.6 to 1.8 days. 
Transaction sequences are broken-up trades. Next, we show that transaction sequences consti-
tute trades that were broken up and do not result from random clustering. We consider the clus-
tering of transactions by the same person in the same direction as evidence for trade splitting. Ab-
sent trade splitting, the direction of insiders’ transactions should be uncorrelated over time, i.e., if 
an insider executes purchases with probability p and sells with probability 1-p, then this uncondi-
tional probability should be equal to the conditional probability given the direction of the last 
transaction. Trade splitting may be active, if insiders post a sequence of market orders, or passive, 
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if they post limit orders that are executed against other orders over a period. The only relevant 
aspect for our analysis is that a sequence of transactions should be regarded as the execution of 
one larger trade. In Appendix C (Table A1 Panel A) we show that conditional on the previous 
transaction being a sale (purchase), the next transaction is also a sale (purchase) in 98.8% 
(96.7%) of all cases. Unconditionally, 20.3% of all transactions are purchases and 79.7% are 
sales, and the difference between the conditional and the unconditional frequencies is statistically 
significant at the 0.01%-level based on a Chi-square test, which rejects the hypothesis that trans-
action sequences occur from random clustering. This result is confirmed in multivariate probit 
regressions (Appendix C Table A1 Panel B), where we control for several exogenous factors that 
might influence the direction of trades. 
The average trade duration for transaction sequences is 1.7 days (1.85 days pre-SOX and 
1.58 days post-SOX) and varies between 1 and 4.75 days. Individual transactions in a transaction 
sequence are only about one half as large as single transactions (median size: $27,160 vs. 
$60,000 or 0.002% vs. 0.013% as a percentage of all shares outstanding). Transaction sequences 
are around four times larger than single transactions (median size: $266,230 vs. $60,000 or 
0.053% vs. 0.013% of all shares outstanding). Table 2 provides summary statistics of all varia-
bles for our sample. We report summary statistics of trades instead of individual transactions be-
cause trades are our units of analysis. 
3 What influences trade duration? 
Since we analyze trade duration, the main unit of analysis for this section is a sequence of trans-
actions and not an individual transaction itself. In a setting in which only one insider trades, both, 
information-based theories and liquidity-based theories, imply that insiders distribute their trades 
over time. We generate contrasting predictions of these theories of optimal trading strategies in 
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two ways. First, as mentioned in the Introduction, our main strategy is to focus on situations 
when several insiders trade simultaneously. Second, we identify moderating factors that influence 
optimal trading strategies and that differ depending on the motive for trading.
6
 We therefore test 
the implications for competition by insiders first and then develop additional hypotheses about 
how the economic environment influences the execution of information-based and liquidity-
based trading strategies. 
Informed trading with competition. Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994) show in the context of 
a Kyle (1985) model that insiders trade more intensely or faster if they compete for the use of the 
same information at the same time. Foster and Viswanathan (1996) and Back, Cao and Willard 
(2000) refine this argument by considering the possibility that insiders have information that is 
positively, but not perfectly correlated. Correlated signals do not alter the theoretical analysis 
qualitatively, because correlated signals can always be decomposed into a common component, 
on which insiders compete, and an idiosyncratic component, to which each insider has unique 
access. These models predict that insiders compete more intensely for the component of the in-
formation they have in common. We therefore have: 
Hypothesis 1: Trade duration decreases if several insiders compete for exploiting the same pri-
vate information. 
Long-lived private information. Kaniel and Liu (2006) show that informed traders do not 
necessarily prefer faster execution, i.e., they do not favor market orders over limit orders. Their 
model distinguishes between short-lived and long-lived information and illustrates that it can be 
                                                          
6
 It may be possible to generate implications about the dynamic profiles of trades. Kyle (1985) predicts that mo-
nopolistic insider trades result in a constant speed of information resolution. Optimal liquidation strategies with-
out privileged fundamental information imply that insiders sell their stakes at a decreasing rate (e.g., Vayanos 
(2001). However, these predictions seem to be highly model-dependent and do not easily lend themselves to em-
pirical testing. 
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optimal for insiders with long-lived private information to use limit orders and bear execution 
risk in exchange for a better price.  
Hypothesis 2: Trade duration increases if insiders have more long-lived compared to short-lived 
private information. 
Liquidity trading. In contrast to informed trading, liquidity-based arguments predict that compe-
tition among insiders leads to an increase in trade duration. We develop this argument more for-
mally in the context of a stylized model in Appendix B and provide the intuition here. The model 
follows the literature on liquidity-induced block trades and extends this literature to the case of 
multiple insiders who trade for liquidity reasons.
7
 The model has two rounds of trading. We 
adopt the terminology of Bessembinder, Carrion, Tuttle and Venkataraman (2016) and distin-
guish between short-lived temporary price impact, which lasts for one period, and long-lived 
temporary price impact, which lasts for two periods. Our model is not information-based. As 
such, it does not feature permanent price impact. Trades have long-lived temporary price impact 
if the market is not “resilient” in the terminology of Bessembinder et al., i.e. if order books do not 
refill immediately and trades have price impact beyond the execution period. In our model, insid-
ers liquidate stakes they do not sell in the two trading periods at the terminal date, at which prices 
will revert to fundamental values. However, shares held to the final date are subject to fundamen-
tal risk, which insiders try to reduce. 
In this framework, assume there are two or more insiders who wish to sell a block of shares 
for liquidity reasons in order to diversify their portfolios. All insiders have a need to trade, for 
example, because they wish to reduce their exposure to the long-term uncertainty about the fun-
                                                          
7
 The model borrows from Bessembinder (2003) and Almgren and Chriss (2001), He and Mamaysky (2005), and 
Huberman and Stanzl (2005), who all use some variant of a mean-variance framework to generate a trade-off be-
tween price impact and immediacy. See Appendix B for further discussions of this literature. 
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damental value of their stock. They do not have any information and trade simultaneously. Insid-
er trades have short-lived and long-lived temporary impact on transaction prices, because trades 
are assumed to be anonymous and market participants cannot distinguish informed trades from 
uninformed trades. 
In this context, trading faster creates benefits from immediate execution as well as costs 
from incurring additional price impact.
8
 Consequently, each insider trades less and distributes her 
transactions over a longer period if other insiders trade simultaneously in the same direction. In-
tuitively, simultaneous trading by other insiders increases the slope of the residual demand func-
tion for each insider.
9
 The increased price impact increases the costs of immediacy and therefore 
slows down trading by each insider. In our model, this effect is stronger if price impact is long-
lived than if it is short-lived, because in the model, short-lived price impact increases costs for 
one period, whereas long-lived price impact increases trading costs in both periods. A final pre-
diction of our model is that the fundamental risk of the stock increases insiders’ demand for im-
mediacy; hence, they should trade the asset faster if the stock is more volatile. 
Hypothesis 3: (1) Trade duration increases with the number of insiders who trade simultaneously 
in the same direction for liquidity reasons. (2) Trade duration decreases with the volatility of the 
stock if insiders sell for liquidity reasons. 
Comparing Hypotheses 1 to 3 shows that information-based and liquidity-based explanations 
have contrasting implications in a context in which multiple insiders trade at the same time. In-
terestingly, the “rat-race effect” modeled by Foster and Viswanathan (1994) does not obtain in 
                                                          
8
 Note that the opposite happens in Vayanos‘ (1999) model. In his framework, additional traders supply liquidity 
and reduce price impact since their endowment shocks are uncorrelated, whereas in our setting, additional traders 
compete for the same liquidity. To the best of our knowledge, no model in the literature extends the liquidity-
based argument to a multiple-trader context. We provide a simple version of such an extension in Appendix B. 
9
 A similar mechanism seems to be at work in Back, Cao and Willard (2000) who show that informed investors 
trade more slowly if their information is uncorrelated. With uncorrelated informed trading, investors do not com-
pete for exploiting the same information, but they still compete for liquidity in the same stock. 
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this case, even though the price impact of trades can be long-lived and last beyond the execution 
period. In Foster and Viswanathan, trades are informed and their permanent price impact moves 
prices towards fundamental values. Accordingly, waiting has a cost, because it reduces the bene-
fits from trading. By contrast, in the model we present in the appendix, insider trades are liquidi-
ty-motivated, even though market participants attribute some likelihood to the possibility that 
they are information motivated. Insiders can hold their shares until some final date at which pric-
es have reverted to fundamental values. Hence, depending on the resilience of the market, prices 
may be distorted for multiple periods, but not indefinitely. Hence, the price impact of trades 
moves prices away from fundamental values and waiting has a benefit. The critical difference, 
which distinguishes the liquidity-model from information models is that some part of insiders’ 
price impact, however long it may last, will be corrected within insiders’ investment horizon. 
4 Empirical analysis 
In this section we present the core of our analysis. First, we develop our empirical approach and 
discuss the three different approaches we use to classify trades (Section 4.1). Next, we test Hy-
potheses 1 to 3 (Section 4.2). We test further hypotheses on the effects of stock market liquidity 
(Section 4.3) and information hierarchies (Section 4.4), comment on the control variables (Sec-
tion 4.5), and finally distinguish between long-lived and short-lived information (Section 4.6). 
4.1 Identification and trade classification 
Testing the implications of the different theoretical approaches requires us to distinguish infor-
mation-based trades from liquidity-based trades and days on which insiders compete from days 
on which this is not the case. We use three approaches to measure the information content of 
trades, all of which have been advocated in the literature. At the end of this section we reflect on 
the advantages and disadvantages of each approach. 
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Our first strategy to classify trades relies on corporate news events. More specifically, we 
use quarterly earnings announcements and M&A announcements for target firms. We find 47,505 
insider trades within four weeks before earnings announcements, which is 10.43% of our sample. 
For these we set Informed (Earnings) equal to one. With four quarterly earnings announcements 
per year, our unconditional expectation, assuming a uniform distribution of trades throughout the 
year, would be that about one-third of trades happen during the four weeks before those an-
nouncements. Hence, insiders seem to avoid trading in the period immediately before earnings 
announcements. For M&A announcements, we define a trade as informed if it takes place within 
four weeks (28 days) before the announcement. Very few insiders trade before M&A announce-
ments; for targets we classify only 856 insider trades as informed, which is only 0.19% of our 
sample. Again, we set Informed (Target) equal to one for these trades. These observations sug-
gest insiders avoid trading during these periods of high public attention, most likely for regulato-
ry and legal reasons. The limitation of the approach based on news announcements is the small 
number of trades we can unequivocally identify as information-based, which limits the power of 
our analysis, especially for the M&A sample. 
Our second approach applies event-study methodology to disclosure day returns to measure 
the information content of insider trades (ex post). We calculate two-day cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs), where the event date is the disclosure date D of the first transaction in a sequence 
(CAR(D,D+1)). We use the market model and proxy for the market return with the CRSP equal-
ly-weighted return index. The estimation window ranges over 200 trading days from 240 until 41 
trading days prior to the disclosure day and we require at least 100 trading days for the parameter 
estimation. This approach is based on the general idea in the insider trading literature (e.g., 
Seyhun (1986), Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog (2006)) that insiders’ trading on private in-
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formation leads to stronger market reactions at the disclosure date. Brochet (2010) uses cumulat-
ed abnormal returns after the disclosure date as measures for the information content of insider 
trades. We define a dummy variable Informed (CAR), which equals one if the two-day cumula-
tive abnormal return is greater in absolute value than the standard deviation of stock returns in the 
month prior to the trade. Additionally, we require that CARs are positive (negative) for purchases 
(sales). Table 3 presents the results for the event study. Insider trades are informative, in line with 
prior literature. Disclosure day returns are significant across all event windows for the pooled 
sample. We find that purchases usually lead to stronger market reactions, in line with prior litera-
ture. 
Third, and finally, we follow Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski (2012) (CMP) and classify in-
formation-based trades by using their distinction between “routine” and “opportunistic” trades. 
CMP use event-study methodology to show that opportunistic trades are on average more in-
formed than routine trades. We adopt CMP’s definition and classify an insider as a routine trader 
if she placed a trade in the same calendar month for at least three years in the past. All subsequent 
trades of the same insider-firm pair are defined as routine trades; for these we set Informed (Op-
portunistic) equal to zero. The remaining insider-firm pairs and all of their subsequent trades are 
classified as opportunistic; for these we set Informed (Opportunistic) equal to one. 
We can apply the classification of CMP only to 15% of our sample, because their classifi-
cation requires at least three years of data for each insider-firm pair. For this part of our sample, 
we classify 58.5% of all trades as opportunistic, compared to 45.2% in CMP’s sample. We attrib-
ute this difference mainly to (1) different sample periods and (2) difference in units of analysis.
10
 
                                                          
10
  Our sample period is from January 1996 to December 2008. CMP’s sample period starts much earlier, in January 
1986, and ends in December 2007. If we use individual and not aggregated transactions as observations like CMP 
do in their summary statistics, we classify only 52.9% of all trades as opportunistic. 
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All three approaches to classifying trades as either informed or uninformed resolve a trade-
off, which results from the ambiguity of assigning trades to either category. All three approaches 
are based on the notion that some trades are unambiguously information-based, whereas others 
are unambiguously liquidity-motivated. The three approaches differ in how they classify trades in 
the gray area in between, in which no clear classification based on observable variables is possi-
ble. The approach based on news announcements is the most conservative and classifies only 
those trades as informed that have a high probability of being based on inside information. Con-
sequently, it probably classifies a significant number of information-based trades falsely as li-
quidity-based. In contrast, the CMP classification takes the opposite approach to categorizing 
trades in the gray area and assigns all trades that are not unambiguously routine to the category of 
opportunistic (informed) trades. In all likelihood, this approach misclassifies many liquidity-
motivated trades as information-based. The event-study based classification strikes a middle 
ground between the other two approaches, by classifying more trades as information-based than 
the news-based approach and by also classifying fewer trades as information-based compared to 
the CMP approach. 
Without observing an error-free benchmark we cannot establish which of the three classifi-
cations is superior for our purpose based on ex ante criteria and therefore proceed by discussing 
the results of all three classifications simultaneously. If we end up misclassifying too many 
trades, we would reduce the power of the tests and introduce attenuation bias, which biases our 
research design against finding support for our hypotheses. 
4.2 Competition for liquidity vs. competition for information 
We measure competition between insiders by counting the number of other insiders who trade 
during a sequence of a particular insider. We define MultipleInsiders as the number of other in-
siders who trade. It equals zero if there are no other insiders who are trading during a sequence of 
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a particular insider. The average (median) value of MultipleInsiders is 0.757 (zero, see Table 2). 
In a robustness check reported in Appendix C (Table A5) we define MultipleInsiders as a dummy 
variable; the results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
We perform the analysis once for each of our three trade classifications in Table 4. We pre-
sent four different classifications, based on earnings announcements (columns (1), (2)), mergers 
and acquisition announcements (columns (3), (4)), cumulative abnormal returns (columns (5), 
(6)), and the CMP classification into opportunistic and routine trades (columns (7), (8)). We for-
mulate additional hypotheses, which motivate the inclusion of additional explanatory variables 
below. We enter all these variables in one regression in order to avoid omitted variable bias. We 
group variables in Table 4 by the associated hypotheses and order them in the order in which we 
discuss them in the text. 
The main coefficients of interest in Table 4 are those on MultipleInsiders and on the inter-
action of MultipleInsiders with Informed. Hypothesis 1 predicts that the coefficient on Multi-
plerInsiders should be negative, whereas Hypothesis 3 predicts the opposite. The coefficient on 
MultipleInsiders is always positive and highly significant. The presence of one additional insider 
who trades in the stock in the same direction increases trade duration on average by 1.5% except 
for the opportunistic/routine classification (columns (7) and (8)), where it is significantly larger 
(2.5% to 3%). Here, percentages express fractions of TradeDuration, which has a mean of 1.3 
days, so an increase of 1.5% (2.5%) corresponds on average to 0.020 (0.033) trading days. 
Hence, the evidence is statistically strong, but economically modest and supports the prediction 
of Hypothesis 3 that insiders compete for the same liquidity and spread their trades over longer 
periods if other insiders trade at the same time. By contrast, the coefficient on MultipleInsiders 
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does not support the predictions of Hypothesis 1 and information-based models for the whole 
sample, because then we should find a negative coefficient. 
Hypotheses 1 and 3 are not mutually exclusive, because some insider trades may be moti-
vated by information whereas others are motivated by liquidity reasons and the result on Multi-
pleInsiders then only shows that liquidity motivations dominate on average. The interaction of 
Informed and MultipleInsiders (see columns (2), (4), (6), and (8)) shows that this seems to be the 
case. The coefficient is significant and negative, with significant point estimates between -0.0088 
and -0.0077 in three cases; for M&A related news this effect is insignificant, probably because 
this classification method identifies too few trades as informed, which creates attenuation bias. 
Hence, the results suggest that insiders trade faster if there is competition from other insiders and 
their trades exploit privileged information. The coefficient on the interaction terms is between 
29% (column (8)) and 132% (column (4)) of the coefficient on MultipleInsiders for all regres-
sions. Hence, we find strong evidence for the predictions of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) 
and Foster and Viswanathan (1996) that competition by insiders for the use of the same infor-
mation leads them to trade faster.  
Hypothesis 3 predicts that liquidity-motivated trades complete faster if insiders are exposed 
to more risk, because the benefits of immediacy increase if the risk of the fundamental value of 
the shares is larger. We find supporting evidence for this prediction. The coefficient on Volatility 
is always negative, and statistically highly significant in all cases, except for the opportunis-
tic/routine classification, for which significance is at the 10% level. Economic significance of this 
effect is relatively small: the coefficient is between -0.0102 and -0.0092 for the six regressions 
where it is statistically significant. Hence, a one-standard deviation increase in Volatility reduces 
TradeDuration by about 0.4%. We conclude that the connection between volatility and the bene-
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fits from immediacy is relatively weak and suspect that the benefits from immediacy arise from 
other considerations. 
4.3 Liquidity effects 
Next, we investigate the impact of several variables that are associated with the liquidity of the 
market and with insiders’ desire to trade on certain days but not on others. Based on the model in 
the appendix, we hypothesize that trade splitting is also a strategy to optimize liquidity. Insiders 
trade over longer intervals of time if the market is less liquid or if they trade on the long side of 
the market, i.e. they buy when other investors want to buy and they sell when other investors 
want to sell. 
Hypothesis 4 (Stock liquidity): (1) Trade duration increases in the illiquidity of the stock. (2) 
Trade duration increases if insiders trade on the long side of the market. 
Liquidity is a somewhat elusive concept and the literature has developed different measures. (See 
Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka (2009) for a recent analysis of liquidity measures.) We wish to 
use a measure that can be calculated on a daily basis. To conserve space we only report results for 
the Amihud measure (Amihud) in Table 4. Table 6 presents the results for other liquidity 
measures (EffectiveSpread, Turnover, PriceImpact), which are discussed in Section 5. Amihud is 
defined as the ratio of the daily absolute return to the dollar trading volume on that day. We as-
sign the value of Amihud on the first day of a transaction sequence to the whole sequence. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 4, we observe significantly longer trade duration for less liquid 
stocks. On average, a one standard deviation increase in the Amihud liquidity measure (0.488 
from Table 2) increases trade duration by about 2.1%, irrespective of the approach we use for 
identifying informed trading. Only with Informed (Opportunistic) do we find a slightly stronger 
effect (2.7%). Hence, the effect of a one-standard deviation change in Amihud has about the same 
economically moderate magnitude as the presence of one additional insider. 
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The variable LongSide intends to capture periods during which insiders are on the long side 
of the market, i.e., situations when insiders want to buy (sell) and there are more investors on the 
buy side (sell side) than on the opposing market side for this stock. We cannot measure the direc-
tion in which other traders want to trade directly and infer it from recent price movements in-
stead.
11
 We conduct this analysis at the firm level and classify insider transactions according to 
the recent share price performance of the firm, assuming that it is more difficult for insiders to 
buy (sell) shares if the stock of their company has outperformed (underperformed) compared to 
all other stocks in the market. We capture this idea by defining the dummy variable LongSide, 
which equals one for purchases (sales) if the stock return of the firm in the previous calendar 
month was in the upper (lower) tercile of the stock returns of all firms in the sample. Hypothesis 
4 predicts a positive sign for LongSide. In Table 4 the coefficient for LongSide is positive as pre-
dicted and highly significant, irrespective of our measure for informed trading, which supports 
the notion that insiders adapt their trading strategies to manage liquidity. Trade duration increases 
on average by about 3.1% if the insider is on the long side of the market, which corresponds to 
the impact of about two (one) additional insiders in columns (1) to (6) (columns (7), (8)). In addi-
tion, Table A2 in Appendix C shows that this effect is driven mostly by sales in a falling market 
rather than by purchases in a rising market. We find similar results for the other definitions of 
Informed. 
4.4 Information hierarchies and the roles of insiders 
Several papers in the insider trading literature investigate the so-called “information hierarchy 
hypothesis,” which holds that those insiders who are closer to the firm have more information 
and their trades have therefore more information content and are more profitable (Seyhun 
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 Using recent returns as measure for order imbalances is not perfect but allows us to proxy for situations when 
insiders are on the long-side of the market without much more computational intensive estimations. 
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(1986)). The empirical evidence on this hypothesis is mixed. Seyhun (1986) shows that the direc-
tors and officers trade on more valuable information than other insiders do. Lin and Howe (1990) 
show that trades by the CEO and the officers and directors of the firm have a higher information 
content than those of unaffiliated shareholders. Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog (2006) find no 
evidence for the information hierarchy hypothesis. Based on our data we can distinguish between 
the CEO, officers other than the CEO, directors who are not officers, the chairperson of the 
board, and other insiders who hold none of these roles. Other insiders are mostly large sharehold-
ers, who have to file their transactions if their ownership exceeds 10% of the outstanding shares. 
The univariate analysis in Table 3 above generates the following ranking in terms of the ab-
solute size of cumulative abnormal returns for CAR(D,D+1) and CAR(D,D+5): 
CEO>Chairperson>Officer>Director>Other, although the return differences between these 
groups are not always statistically significant. The ranking for purchases is in line with predic-
tions based on the information hierarchy hypothesis. In particular, we would always expect CEOs 
to be best informed and other insiders to be least informed. For CARs measured over longer 
event windows, the ranking between Chairperson and Officer is reversed; for sales, we cannot 
observe a clear ranking. 
Based on this observation, we expect that those insiders who trade for information reasons 
trade faster when they expect competition for the use of the same information from other insiders, 
whereas they trade more slowly if they do not expect competition. Insiders at the top of the in-
formation hierarchy should face less competition than those at the bottom, because insiders at the 
top of the information hierarchy share their privileged information with fewer other insiders. In 
particular, we expect the CEO to have access to more unique information than other officers and 
directors. Based on the theory of Foster and Viswanathan (1994), we therefore expect that insid-
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ers at the top of the information hierarchy trade less intensely and spread their trades over longer 
periods, whereas insiders at the bottom of the information hierarchy trade faster. 
Hypothesis 5 (Information Hierarchy): Insiders at the bottom of the information hierarchy trade 
faster, whereas those at the top of the information hierarchy spread their trades over longer pe-
riods. 
We test this hypothesis by including dummy variables for all categories of insiders except the 
CEO in Table 4, so the coefficients for the four remaining insider groups have to be interpreted 
relative to the CEO of the company. We do observe large and negative coefficients for Officer 
and Director, showing that this group trades faster than the CEO, in line with the predictions of 
Hypothesis 5. The coefficient on Chairperson is positive and significant for all definitions of In-
formed except for Informed (Opportunistic). Contrary to the predictions of Hypothesis 5, the 
largest and positive coefficient obtains for Other, which suggests that other insiders mostly trade 
for reasons not related to the exploitation of information. In Table 4, we control for actual compe-
tition because we include MultipleInsiders in the regressions. In unreported robustness checks, 
we interact each of the insider-role dummies with MultipleInsiders to account for differences in 
the degree to which they are subject to competition from others. We find qualitatively similar but 
somewhat weaker results. CEOs trade slowly compared to officers and directors, which is con-
sistent with Hypothesis 5, whereas insiders who have no operating role in the firm trade more 
slowly than all other groups of insiders, probably because they should not be considered insiders. 
4.5 Control variables 
We control for several other factors that may influence trade duration beyond those on which we 
form explicit hypotheses. The most obvious source of price impact is the size of the stake an in-
sider intends to trade. It is not possible to assign trade size unambiguously to either information-
based or to liquidity-based explanations. Insiders may wish to trade larger stakes because they 
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have stronger informative signals or because of liquidity shocks. In both cases, they may want to 
spread their trades over a longer period. We control for trade size by including dummy variables 
for each decile of Stake. Stake is defined as the number of shares traded scaled by the number of 
shares outstanding. This non-parametric approach seems rather general and capable of capturing 
a range of different relationships between aggregate trade size and trade duration. We do not re-
port the coefficients in our tables to conserve space. The impact of trade size is positive as ex-
pected. Trade duration increases by about 50% from the first decile to the tenth size decile. 
Hence, the effects we observe in Table 5 obtain all after controlling for trade size. 
We control for firm size using LogMarketCap, the logarithm of the market capitalization of 
the company, and observe that trade duration increases significantly with firm size. This observa-
tion is surprising, since larger stocks are more liquid. We attribute this finding to the fact that we 
already control for the relevant aspects of firm size by including liquidity measures and transac-
tion size, so that LogMarketCap picks up residual effects. We include Purchase, a dummy varia-
ble that equals one for purchases and zero for sales in all regressions where we do not split the 
sample into purchases and sales. Completing purchase transactions takes about 1.2% (with In-
formed (Earnings)) and 2.1% (with Informed (Opportunistic)) longer compared to sales; we pro-
vide sample splits for purchases and sales in Appendix C Table A2. 
4.6 Long-lived versus short-lived information 
In Table 5 we test Hypothesis 2, which predicts that trade duration increases if insiders have 
long-lived private information. In order to test this hypothesis we follow Cicero and Wintoki 
(2014) and separate Informed (Opportunistic) trades into isolated trades and sequenced trades. 
Isolated trades are all opportunistic trades that happen in isolated months, i.e., there are no trades 
by the same insider in the month before or after. Sequenced trades are opportunistic trades that 
occur in consecutive months. Cicero and Wintoki argue that insiders who possess short-lived pri-
 - 26 - 
vate information are more likely to use isolated trades, whereas insiders with long-lived private 
information use sequenced trades. We define the dummy variable LongLived to equal one for se-
quenced trades and zero for isolated trades. This separation allows us to test whether both types 
of informed trading (short-lived and long-lived) have the same implications for TradeDuration. 
The results presented in columns (1) to (4) of Table 5 show that insiders possessing long-lived 
private information trade more slowly. Compared to informed trades based on short-lived private 
information TradeDuration increases by 13.4% (coefficient of LongLived in column (4)); com-
pared to liquidity motivated trades, TradeDuration increases by 3.6% (sum of coefficients of 
LongLived and Informed (Opportunistic) in column (4)). These effects are quantitatively some-
what stronger than those of one additional insider or a one-standard deviation increase in Amihud. 
The results are in line with the model of Kaniel and Liu (2006), which predicts that insiders will 
trade more slowly when information is long-lived. The positive and significant interaction of 
LongLived and MultipleInsiders shows that trade duration increases even more (by about 2.2%) if 
insiders with long-lived private information face competition from other insiders. None of the 
models we consider above predicts this result, which makes it somewhat hard to interpret. How-
ever, if sufficiently long-lived information does not dissipate quickly in the market, insiders may 
not become subject to the “rat race” described in Foster and Viswanathan (1996). In this scenario, 
competition between insiders actually increases trade duration.
12
 
5 Robustness checks 
We perform a number of robustness checks to see if our results are sensitive to different measures 
of liquidity, alternative definitions for transaction sequences, and alternative definitions of In-
formed. Table  presents results on robustness tests using different liquidity measures. Depending 
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  The definition of sequenced trades already implies that insiders trade based on this information for at least two 
consecutive months, which means information is not quickly observed by the market. 
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on the liquidity measure used, we find different effects of liquidity on trade duration. For Turno-
ver, we find similar results to our benchmark specification with Amihud. However, for Effec-
tiveSpread and PriceImpact the sign of the coefficient estimated is reversed and does not support 
Hypothesis 4 for all definitions of Informed except for Informed (Opportunistic). However, these 
results are only significant at the 5%-level for PriceImpact; economic significance is weak. We 
have two potential explanations for this rather surprising result: (1) EffectiveSpread and PriceIm-
pact could also capture informed trading, including informed trading by investors outside the 
firm. Insiders are likely to trade faster if they are afraid that other market participants have similar 
private information;
13
 (2) in unreported results we find that EffectiveSpread and PriceImpact are 
highly correlated with LogMarketCap and transaction size, therefore it is possible that those vari-
ables already control for liquidity, and EffectiveSpread and PriceImpact may only pick up residu-
al effects. Second, we split the sample for the pre- and post-SOX period (see Appendix C Table 
A2). Most coefficients are quite similar for both subsamples.  
Third, we use alternative definitions of transaction sequences. Our baseline definition re-
quires that all transactions of the sequence be executed within seven days of the first trade. This 
definition is arbitrary. We therefore vary the maximum length of a transaction sequence to three 
and 14 days (see Appendix C Table A3). For the coefficients on Informed, MultipleInsiders, and 
their interactions, we mostly observe a higher economic and statistical significance if we increase 
the maximum length of a trade. In a second step, we link the length of a transaction sequence to 
the disclosure date of the first trade in the sequence. If insiders split trades in order to hide their 
                                                          
13
  Mehta, Reeb and Zhao (2014) argue that managers often possess private information about business partners or 
competitors and exploit this private information by trading in the stocks of these companies. Their results imply 
that insiders have not only to fear insiders of their own company to exploit the same information but also others 
from outside the firm. 
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information, sequences should end when the first transaction is publicly disclosed. We do not ob-
serve qualitative changes if we define transaction sequences and trades accordingly. 
Fourth, we report results for alternative definitions of Informed (CAR) based on abnormal 
returns (see Appendix C Table A4). Instead of our baseline definition, which uses CAR(D,D+1), 
we define Informed (CAR) based on CAR(D,D+5) to capture a delayed incorporation of infor-
mation into prices after disclosure. Moreover, we also include the insider trading period, because 
some of the information may already be incorporated through insider trading during this time. All 
measures classify a similar percentage of trades as informed and our results are qualitatively un-
changed. Finally, we rerun our regression with Cicero and Wintoki’s definition of isolated and 
sequenced trades instead of Informed (Opportunistic). Results are mostly unaffected by these 
variations. 
6 Do insiders time the liquidity of the market? 
The previous section shows that liquidity concerns are of primary importance for the decision of 
corporate insiders to break up their trades and to spread their transactions over time. In this sec-
tion, we analyze if and to what extent insiders adapt their trading strategies to fluctuations in 
market liquidity. 
Illiquidity is expensive for insiders, so they should avoid trading on days when the stock is 
less liquid and trade more if the stock is more liquid to minimize transaction costs. Liquidity tim-
ing in this sense has been documented for hedge funds (Cao, Chen, Liang and Lo (2013)) and ac-
tivist shareholders (Norli, Ostergaard and Schindele (2014), Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2015)). 
Furthermore, if insiders trade, they should trade larger quantities on days on which liquidity is 
higher. This argument assumes that insiders can observe liquidity and time their trades according-
ly. In Appendix B, we formally derive this argument in the context of a highly stylized model. 
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Hypothesis 6 (Liquidity timing): Insiders trade more on days with higher stock liquidity and less 
on days with lower liquidity. 
We first perform univariate tests and then conduct multivariate regressions to test Hypothesis 6. 
For the univariate tests, we compare the equally-weighted and the trade-size weighted means of 
four liquidity measures over all days on which an insider actually trades during a transaction se-
quence. Trade-size weighting gives more weight to those days of the transaction sequence on 
which the insider trades more. Hence, if insiders optimize their trades with respect to the liquidity 
of the market, then we should observe that the trade-size weighted average for each liquidity 
measure implies higher liquidity than the equally-weighted average. Univariate results presented 
in the Appendix C (Table A6) are in line with the predictions of Hypothesis 6 and support the 
notion that insiders optimize their trades with respect to market liquidity. 
In Table 7, we perform multivariate probit regressions in which the dependent variable 
equals one if an insider trades on a certain day and zero otherwise. The independent variable of 
interest is the liquidity measure and we use four different liquidity measures, one in each regres-
sion. We expect more insider trading on days with high stock liquidity; hence, we expect this co-
efficient to be negative for all measures except Turnover. 
We control for a number of effects: The lag of the trading dummy, the absolute return of 
the stock on the same day, which is a day-to-day proxy for market volatility, the abnormal market 
volume proxied by the percentage deviation in U.S. market equity trading volume on that day 
from the average daily equity trading volume in that month. We define BeforeEarn to equal one 
in the 14-day period before an earnings announcement and AfterEarn to equal one in the 14-day 
period after an earnings announcement. We do not include the absolute stock return in regression 
(1), which uses Amihud as a liquidity measure, because Amihud is mechanically related to the ab-
solute stock return. Additionally, we control for calendar months and day-of-the-week effects. 
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 We find strong support for the liquidity-timing hypothesis. The coefficients on all four li-
quidity measures have the predicted signs and are highly significant, at least at the 0.01%-level. 
Hence, insiders trade on days with higher stock market liquidity and avoid trading on days with 
low liquidity. We also confirm earlier findings that insiders trade less before and more after earn-
ings announcements. Additionally, we observe that insiders trade more on days on which the vol-
atility of the stock as measured by absolute stock returns is high as well as on days on which the 
market volume is high. Insiders also prefer to trade at the beginning of the week. Overall, we find 
strong support for the liquidity-timing hypothesis. Insiders seem to adapt their trading strategies 




We analyze the trading strategies of corporate insiders on two dimensions: the duration of their 
trades and if and how they adapt their trading strategies to the liquidity of the market. We com-
pare information-based theories with liquidity-based theories and focus on situations where sev-
eral insiders trade simultaneously. Information-based theories predict that insiders trade faster if 
they compete with other insiders, whereas liquidity-based theories predict the opposite. 
We find strong evidence for both theories. Insiders trade more slowly if they compete with 
other insiders. We apply three different methods to identify informed trades and find that these 
trades are completed significantly faster if multiple insiders compete for exploiting the same pri-
vate information, which provides strong support for the predictions of information-based models 
with competition between insiders. 
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 In Appendix C (Table A7), we perform three additional robustness checks using multivariate OLS regressions 
with Stake as dependent variable to test the liquidity-timing hypothesis: (1) we add firm-fixed effects (Panel A); 
(2) we use first differences (Panel B); (3) split the sample at the median ratio of Stake over Turnover to alleviate 
reverse causality concerns. All three tests support the liquidity-timing hypothesis.  
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Further theoretical work is needed to address the issues of competition among traders in a 
more elaborate framework compared to extant theories and compared to the simple model we de-
velop in the appendix. In particular, liquidity-based models should allow for multiple traders with 
correlated liquidity shocks who simultaneously demand liquidity in the same market. It would be 
desirable to have models that endogenously derive how informed as well as uninformed traders 
optimally adapt their trading strategies. 
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Figure 1: Development of transaction sequences over time 
Panel A: Proportion of transaction sequences relative to all trades 
The figure displays the development of the proportion of transaction sequences of all insider trades over the 





Panel B: Number of transactions in a transaction sequence 
The figure displays the development of the average number of individual transactions in a transaction sequence 
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Panel C: Average trade duration of transaction sequences 
The figure displays the development of the average trade duration of transaction sequences over the sample peri-
od. Single transactions are excluded. The dashed vertical line marks the month when the Sarbanes-Oxley act 
came into force (August 2002). 
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Tables 
Table 1: Sample design 
This table displays how our sample is constructed from raw Thomson Reuters Insider Filing database (IFDF) 
data to our final sample. We include all open market and private transactions in the IFDF database (Table One) 
between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 2008 in our initial dataset. We report the losses of observations after 




% Firms Insider 
IFDF data 3,272,073 100.0% 18,380 151,523 
Observations lost because of:     
   Missing stock data on CRSP 300,033 9.2%   
   Missing price or volume information on IFDF 9,587 0.3%   
   Purchases and sales by the same insider on the same day 26,030 0.8%   
   # shares traded > total # of shares traded at the same day 129,139 3.9%   
   Insufficient data for event window or estimation period 297,050 9.1%   
Exclude transactions if # of shares traded is not a multiple 
of 10 470,437 14.4%   
   Aggregate all transactions of the same stock in the same 
direction by the same insider on the same day and 
at the same price into one transaction 190,284 5.8%   
Final sample 1,849,513 56.5% 11,013 99,413 
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
This table displays descriptive statistics for all variables used in our analysis. Insider trading data are taken from 
IFDF, accounting data from Compustat, market data from CRSP, and intraday data from TAQ. 




AfterEarn 455,484 0.203 0 0.403 0 1 
Amihud 455,373 0.138 0.003 0.488 0.000 3.1 
BeforeEarn 455,484 0.039 0 0.194 0 1 
CEO 455,484 0.121 0 0.326 0 1 
Chairperson 455,484 0.027 0 0.163 0 1 
Director 455,484 0.310 0 0.463 0 1 
EffectiveSpread 410,092 1.97% 0.55% 4.62% 0.00% 50.00% 
Informed (Earnings) 455,484 0.104 0 0.306 0 1 
Informed (Target) 455,484 0.002 0 0.043 0 1 
Informed (CAR) 455,484 0.139 0 0.346 0 1 
Informed (Opportunistic) 68,837 0.585 1 0.492 0 1 
Long-lived 68,837 0.216 0 0.411 0 1 
MarketCap (in million $) 455,484 4,808 548 21,507 0.1 571,816 
MultipleInsiders 455,484 0.757 0 1.648 0 44 
Officer 455,484 0.444 0 0.497 0 1 
Other 455,484 0.097 0 0.296 0 1 
PriceImpact 414,151 0.017 0.007 0.037 0.000 1 
Purchase 455,484 0.320 0 0.466 0 1 
LongSide 455,484 0.277 0 0.447 0 1 
SOX 455,484 0.500 1 0.500 0 1 
Stake 455,484 0.098% 0.023% 0.260% 0.000% 30.024% 
TradeDuration 455,458 1.300 1 0.652 1 4.375 
Purchases 145,578 1.276 1 0.644 1 4.375 
Sales 309,880 1.312 1 0.655 1 4.375 
Turnover 455,484 0.013 0.006 0.056 0.000 9 
Volatility 455,313 0.522 0.409 0.413 0.009 19 
Volume (in thousand $) 455,484 1128 123 11004 0.010 2,355,720 
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Table 3: Event study analysis of disclosure day returns 
This table reports the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of insider purchases and sales for four different inter-
vals after the disclosure date. The CARs are estimated using the market model, the estimation period for the pa-
rameters is (-240, -41). In the lower panel, the table reports the CARs for five different insider groups. The table 
displays the CAR and, in round brackets, the t-statistic of the two-sided t-test for the null-hypothesis that the 
respective CAR equals zero. The t-statistic for the difference between CEO and the four other insider groups.is 
reported in square brackets.  
 
 CAR(D,D+1) CAR(D,D+5) CAR(D,D+20) CAR(D,D+40) 
 purchases sales purchases sales purchases sales purchases sales 
All 0.0082 -0.0014 0.0187 -0.0050 0.0256 -0.0152 0.0267 -0.0244 
 (6.22) (-2.59) (8.19) (-5.30) (5.97) (-8.60) (4.46) (-9.91) 
CEO 0.0135 -0.0015 0.0299 -0.0049 0.0425 -0.0162 0.0498 -0.0265 
 (3.31) (-1.40) (4.21) (-2.56) (3.20) (-4.55) (2.69) (-5.35) 
Chairperson 0.0116 -0.0004 0.0228 -0.0035 0.0289 -0.0132 0.0423 -0.0218 
 (1.58) (-0.16) (1.78) (-0.82) (1.21) (-1.64) (1.27) (-1.94) 
 [0.39] [-0.80] [0.83] [-0.55] [0.85] [-0.65] [0.33] [-0.74] 
Officer 0.0089 -0.0014 0.0222 -0.0053 0.0360 -0.0164 0.0461 -0.0281 
 (2.76) (-1.65) (3.96) (-3.69) (3.44) (-6.11) (3.15) (-7.49) 
 [1.29] [-0.18] [1.23] [0.27] [0.55] [0.08] [0.23] [0.37] 
Director 0.0076 -0.0012 0.0171 -0.0051 0.0263 -0.0136 0.0259 -0.0218 
 (3.51) (-1.04) (4.57) (-2.53) (3.76) (-3.63) (2.65) (-4.17) 
 [2.09] [-0.29] [2.59] [0.10] [1.75] [-0.69] [1.85] [-0.92] 
Other 0.0058 -0.0021 0.0132 -0.0046 0.0109 -0.0129 0.0043 -0.0140 
 (2.56) (-1.07) (3.38) (-1.37) (1.49) (-2.07) (0.42) (-1.61) 
 [2.64] [0.36] [3.28] [-0.12] [3.32] [-0.70] [3.43] [-1.92] 
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Table 4: Determinants of Trade Duration 
The table presents results for OLS regressions with LogTradeDuration as the dependent variable. The definition 
of Informed in Columns (1) and (2) is based on earnings announcements. An insider trade is classified as in-
formed if it takes place within 28 days before an earnings announcement. Columns (3) and (4) report results for 
the definition of Informed, based on M&A announcements.  An insider trade is classified as informed if it takes 
place in a target firm within 28 days before an M&A announcement. Columns (5) and (6) report results for the 
definition of Informed, based on event study returns, and Columns (7) and (8) for the definition of Informed fol-
lowing Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski (2012) for the subsample where it is available. See Appendix A for a defi-
nition of all variables. For each independent variable, the table displays the slope estimate and, in parentheses, 
the t-statistic of the two-sided t-test for the null-hypothesis that the respective coefficient equals zero. Standard 
errors allow for clustering at the firm level. All regressions include calendar year dummies, industry dummies, 
and dummies for each stake decile. 
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  LogTradeDuration 





















MultipleInsiders 0.0146 0.0153 0.0145 0.0145 0.0145 0.0156 0.0251 0.0305 
 (10.28) (10.58) (10.24) (10.24) (10.25) (10.70) (10.27) (7.28) 
Informed 0.0196 0.0250 -0.0131 -0.0026 -0.0162 -0.0096 -0.0522 -0.0462 
 (6.47) (8.35) (-0.48) (-0.09) (-8.62) (-3.81) (-7.69) (-6.43) 
MultipleInsiders  -0.0077  -0.0191  -0.0088  -0.0088 
*Informed  (-2.43)  (-0.94)  (-2.61)  (-2.06) 
Volatility -0.0092 -0.0092 -0.0102 -0.0102 -0.0094 -0.0094 -0.0165 -0.0162 




LongSide 0.0315 0.0314 0.0316 0.0316 0.0315 0.0316 0.0257 0.0258 
 (15.78) (15.82) (15.93) (15.93) (15.94) (16.01) (6.01) (6.04) 
Amihud 0.0437 0.0436 0.0436 0.0436 0.0435 0.0434 0.0533 0.0533 
 




Chairperson 0.0325 0.0323 0.0325 0.0325 0.0324 0.0324 0.0331 0.0332 
 
(2.87) (2.86) (2.87) (2.87) (2.86) (2.86) (1.39) (1.38) 
Officer -0.0384 -0.0384 -0.0394 -0.0393 -0.0394 -0.0393 -0.0329 -0.0329 
 
(-6.67) (-6.75) (-6.90) (-6.90) (-6.92) (-6.93) (-3.50) (-3.50) 
Director -0.0202 -0.0203 -0.0209 -0.0209 -0.0210 -0.0209 0.0063 0.0064 
 
(-3.62) (-3.67) (-3.78) (-3.78) (-3.80) (-3.80) (0.59) (0.59) 
Other 0.1160 0.1159 0.1172 0.1171 0.1170 0.1169 0.1424 0.1429 








LogMarketCap 0.0224 0.0223 0.0222 0.0222 0.0222 0.0222 0.0205 0.0204 
 
(19.04) (19.01) (18.85) (18.85) (18.93) (18.92) (7.60) (7.57) 
SOX -0.0252 -0.0249 -0.0256 -0.0256 -0.0251 -0.0252 -0.0593 -0.0589 
 
(-2.98) (-2.95) (-3.03) (-3.03) (-2.97) (-2.98) (-4.11) (-4.10) 
Purchase 0.0115 0.0117 0.0111 0.0111 0.0121 0.0121 0.0210 0.0211 
  (3.12) (3.16) (2.99) (2.99) (3.24) (3.26) (1.98) (1.99) 
  Observations 420,814 420,814 420,814 420,814 420,814 420,814 65,719 65,719 
  R² 0.271 0.271 0.271 0.271 0.271 0.271 0.291 0.291 
 Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 StakeDecile FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 5: Short vs. long-lived information 
The table presents results for OLS regressions with LogTradeDuration as the dependent variable. The definition 
of Informed follows Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski (2012) for the subsample where it is available. Columns (1) to 
(4) include a measure for long-lived private information, LongLived. Following Cicero and Wintoki (2014) this 
variable is 1 for all opportunistic trades that spread over multiple consecutive months (sequenced trades), and 0 
otherwise. See Appendix A for a definition of all variables. For each independent variable, the table displays the 
slope estimate and, in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided t-test for the null-hypothesis that the respective 
coefficient equals zero. Standard errors allow for clustering at the firm level. All regressions include calendar 
year dummies, industry dummies, and dummies for each stake decile. 
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  LogTradeDuration 
Definition of Informed: Opportunistic 
  
 










MultipleInsiders 0.0251 0.0224 0.0247 0.0302 
 (10.66) (8.86) (10.43) (7.09) 
Informed     -0.1092 -0.0984 
     (-16.72) (-14.54) 
MultipleInsiders      -0.0160 
*Informed      (-3.69) 
LongLived 0.0926 0.0833 0.1493 0.1344 
 (11.47) (9.60) (19.98) (17.03) 
MultipleInsiders   0.0137  0.0219 
*LongLived   (3.01)  (4.91) 
Volatility -0.0209 -0.0211 -0.0149 -0.0146 




LongSide 0.0298 0.0299 0.0244 0.0249 
 (7.11) (7.16) (5.94) (6.06) 
Amihud 0.0574 0.0574 0.0518 0.0519 
 




Chairperson 0.0406 0.0410 0.0318 0.0324 
 
(1.70) (1.71) (1.36) (1.38) 
Officer -0.0305 -0.0307 -0.0166 -0.0168 
 
(-3.19) (-3.21) (-1.83) (-1.85) 
Director 0.0124 0.0124 0.0189 0.0189 
 
(1.12) (1.11) (1.83) (1.83) 
Other 0.1503 0.1502 0.1370 0.1377 








LogMarketCap 0.0230 0.0229 0.0229 0.0227 
 
(8.69) (8.68) (8.95) (8.87) 
SOX -0.0504 -0.0503 -0.0515 -0.0506 
 
(-3.56) (-3.55) (-3.71) (-3.67) 
Purchase 0.0237 0.0236 0.0331 0.0332 
  (2.22) (2.21) (3.22) (3.23) 
  Observations 65,719 65,719 65,719 65,719 
  R² 0.297 0.297 0.313 0.314 
 Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 StakeDecile FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 6: Trade duration: Robustness checks 
This table presents results for OLS regressions with LogTradeDuration as the dependent variable.  Results for 
three different liquidity measures are reported: (1) EffectiveSpread, (2) Turnover, and (3) PriceImpact. The 
header of the table reports the measure used for each column. Coefficients for each of the liquidity measures are 
reported in the line Liquidity Measure. Panel A displays results for the definition of Informed based on earnings 
announcements and M&A announcements. Panel B presents results for the definition of Informed, based on 
event study returns and opportunistic trades following Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski (2012) for the subsample 
where it is available. See Appendix A for a definition of all variables. For each independent variable, the table 
displays the slope estimate and, in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided t-test for the null-hypothesis that 
the respective coefficient equals zero. Standard errors allow for clustering at the firm level. All regressions in-
clude calendar year dummies, industry dummies, and dummies for each stake decile.  
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MultipleInsiders 0.0156 0.0161 0.0155 0.0147 0.0153 0.0147 
 (9.84) (10.85) (9.87) (9.57) (10.62) (9.60) 
Informed 0.0256 0.0250 0.0252 -0.0124 0.0013 -0.0139 
 (8.24) (8.43) (8.19) (-0.44) (0.05) (-0.49) 
MultipleInsiders -0.0089 -0.0079 -0.0085 -0.0035 -0.0047 -0.0060 
*Informed (-2.66) (-2.49) (-2.57) (-0.20) (-0.25) (-0.34) 
Volatility -0.0048 0.0040 -0.0051 -0.0060 0.0030 -0.0062 




LongSide 0.0307 0.0308 0.0305 0.0308 0.0310 0.0307 
 (14.68) (15.40) (14.72) (14.78) (15.50) (14.83) 
Liquidity Measure -0.0253 -0.4168 -0.0424 -0.0247 -0.4162 -0.0417 
 




Chairperson 0.0383 0.0330 0.0377 0.0387 0.0332 0.0380 
 
(3.13) (2.91) (3.11) (3.14) (2.91) (3.12) 
Officer -0.0395 -0.0391 -0.0394 -0.0404 -0.0400 -0.0402 
 
(-6.61) (-6.85) (-6.59) (-6.74) (-7.00) (-6.71) 
Director -0.0216 -0.0215 -0.0218 -0.0222 -0.0220 -0.0224 
 
(-3.72) (-3.88) (-3.76) (-3.82) (-3.98) (-3.86) 
Other 0.1112 0.1143 0.1111 0.1125 0.1155 0.1124 
 








LogMarketCap 0.0175 0.0184 0.0180 0.0173 0.0182 0.0178 
 
(13.99) (16.18) (14.64) (13.85) (16.04) (14.48) 
SOX -0.0239 -0.0242 -0.0237 -0.0246 -0.0249 -0.0244 
 
(-2.74) (-2.85) (-2.71) (-2.82) (-2.94) (-2.79) 
Purchase 0.0162 0.0132 0.0169 0.0156 0.0127 0.0163 
 
(4.22) (3.57) (4.42) (4.06) (3.40) (4.27) 
  Observations 379,645 420,851 383,263 379,645 420,851 383,263 
  R² 0.271 0.272 0.269 0.270 0.272 0.269 
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MultipleInsiders 0.0159 0.0164 0.0159 0.0310 0.0321 0.0310 
 (10.04) (10.90) (10.07) (7.14) (7.32) (7.13) 
Informed -0.0106 -0.0093 -0.0102 -0.0449 -0.0479 -0.0448 
 (-3.97) (-3.80) (-3.84) (-6.23) (-6.69) (-6.21) 
MultipleInsiders -0.0097 -0.0082 -0.0097 -0.0095 -0.0082 -0.0096 
*Informed (-2.65) (-2.53) (-2.66) (-2.18) (-1.87) (-2.19) 
Volatility -0.0050 0.0036 -0.0053 -0.0117 0.0053 -0.0110 




LongSide 0.0308 0.0309 0.0306 0.0235 0.0255 0.0236 
 (14.84) (15.58) (14.90) (5.57) (6.02) (5.61) 
Liquidity Measure -0.0263 -0.4131 -0.0408 0.0972 -1.0754 0.0073 
 




Chairperson 0.0385 0.0331 0.0379 0.0371 0.0326 0.0370 
 
(3.13) (2.90) (3.11) (1.52) (1.37) (1.52) 
Officer -0.0404 -0.0400 -0.0403 -0.0332 -0.0333 -0.0332 
 
(-6.77) (-7.02) (-6.75) (-3.45) (-3.55) (-3.45) 
Director -0.0223 -0.0221 -0.0225 0.0050 0.0039 0.0049 
 
(-3.85) (-4.01) (-3.90) (0.45) (0.36) (0.44) 
Other 0.1122 0.1153 0.1121 0.1471 0.1400 0.1469 
 








LogMarketCap 0.0174 0.0183 0.0179 0.0178 0.0174 0.0176 
 
(13.93) (16.13) (14.58) (6.41) (6.69) (6.37) 
SOX -0.0240 -0.0244 -0.0238 -0.0600 -0.0609 -0.0599 
 
(-2.75) (-2.89) (-2.73) (-4.00) (-4.27) (-3.99) 
Purchase 0.0168 0.0137 0.0175 0.0311 0.0273 0.0317 
 
(4.36) (3.65) (4.55) (2.79) (2.55) (2.84) 
  Observations 379,645 420,851 383,263 63,140 65,720 63,185 
  R² 0.271 0.272 0.269 0.292 0.295 0.292 
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Table 7: Liquidity timing: Determinants of insider trading days 
The table presents results for probit regressions with Trading as the dependent variable. Trading is equal to 1 for 
days on which insiders trade, and 0 otherwise. Regressions include all non-trading days within a transaction se-
quence as well as up to 20 non-trading days before the first trading day in a sequence and up to 20 non-trading 
days after the last trading day in a sequence. The header of the table reports the liquidity measure used for each 
column. Coefficients for each of the liquidity measures are reported in the line Liquidity measure. See Appendix 
A for a definition of all variables. For each independent variable, the table displays the marginal effects (evaluat-
ed at the mean of the independent variables) and, in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided t-test for the null-
hypothesis that the respective coefficient equals zero. Standard errors allow for clustering at the firm level. All 










  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LagTrading 0.3480 0.3487 0.3450 0.3447 
 (146.4) (136.4) (144.9) (136.1) 
Liquidity measure -0.0063 -0.2451 0.3408 -0.3109 
 (-40.86) (-37.43) (19.66) (-39.19) 
Absolute return 
 
0.1598 0.0904 0.1693 
 
 
(38.15) (12.95) (42.04) 
% change in market volume 0.0126 0.0099 0.0090 0.0105 
 (15.93) (11.86) (11.61) (12.74) 
BeforeEarn -0.0283 -0.0295 -0.0280 -0.0289 
 (-43.28) (-42.36) (-43.19) (-42.12) 
AfterEarn 0.0223 0.0224 0.0216 0.0225 




0.0063 0.0073 0.0059 0.0071 
 (9.06) (9.57) (8.66) (9.49) 
Tuesday 0.0041 0.0043 0.0040 0.0042 
 (8.77) (8.57) (8.79) (8.50) 
Wednesday 0.0005 0.0008 0.0006 0.0007 
 (1.16) (1.49) (1.20) (1.40) 
Thursday 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 
 (0.65) (0.64) (0.53) (0.56) 
Observations 7,382,052 6,504,796 7,487,992 6,610,461 
R² 0.149 0.153 0.150 0.152 
Calendar month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Variable definitions 
This table defines all variables used in this paper. Insider trading data are taken from IFDF, accounting data from 
Compustat, market data from CRSP and intraday transaction data from TAQ. 
Variable Description Source 
%Change in 
Market Volume 
Percentage deviation in U.S. market equity trading volume 
on a particular day from an average daily equity trading 
volume in that month  
Datastream 
Absolute Return Absolute daily stock return CRSP 
AfterEarn 1 for all transactions executed in the 14 days after an earn-
ings announcement (if available), zero otherwise 
Compustat 
Amihud Amihud’s measure of illiquidity, defined as the ratio of the 
daily absolute return to the dollar trading volume on that 
day (Amihud (2002)) 
CRSP 
BeforeEarn 1 for all transactions executed in the 14 days before an 
earnings announcement (if available), zero otherwise 
Compustat 
CEO 1 if trade is executed by the CEO, zero otherwise IFDF 
Chairperson 1 if trade is executed by the chairperson of the supervisory 
board, who is not an officer, zero otherwise 
IFDF 
Director 1 if trade is executed by a member of the board (not includ-
ing the chairperson) who is not an officer, zero otherwise 
IFDF 
EffectiveSpread Daily average of 2 t t tP Q Q , where Qt is the quote mid-
point and Pt is the price at which a transaction is executed; 
observations with EffectiveSpread>0.5 are set to missing 
values 
TAQ 
Informed, CAR 1 if the disclosure date CAR(D,D+1) is greater in absolute 
value than the standard deviation of residuals from the 
market model multiplied by √2. The market model is esti-






1 for all opportunistic trades, following the definition of 
Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski (2012), zero otherwise  
IFDF 
Informed, Target 1 for all trades by insiders of target firms that take place 
within 28 days of a takeover announcement, zero otherwise 
IFDF, SDC 
Informed, Earnings 1 for all trades that take place within 28 days of an earnings 
announcement, zero otherwise 
IFDF, 
Compustat 
LogMarketCap Natural logarithm of market capitalization CRSP 
LogTradeDuration Natural logarithm of TradeDuration IFDF 
MarketCap Market value of equity at the transaction date in million $ CRSP 
MultipleInsiders Number of insiders if more than one insider trades on any 
day during a given transaction sequence in the same direc-
tion, zero otherwise 
IFDF 
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Variable      Description Source 
Officer 1 if trade is executed by an officer (not including the CEO) IFDF 
Other 1 for all insiders who are not classified as an officer, chair-
person, director, or CEO 
IFDF 
PriceImpact The measure of price impact of each trade after 5 minutes, 
defined as 52  t t tQ Q Q , with Qt+5 representing the quote 
midpoint price of the stock after five minutes.  
TAQ 
Purchase 1 if the transaction is a purchase, zero otherwise IFDF 
RunupCAR Cumulative abnormal return over a 20-day event window 
(-20,-1) ending one day before the trading day for sales and 
purchases; CARs of sales are multiplied by -1 
CRSP 
LongLived 1 for all opportunistic trades that spread over multiple con-
secutive months (sequenced trades), according to the classi-
fication of Cicero and Wintoki (2014), zero otherwise 
IFDF 
LongSide 1 for purchases if StockTercile=3; 1 for sales if Stock-
Tercile=1; zero otherwise 
CRSP 
Sentiment Monthly sentiment index, taken from Baker and Wurgler 
(2006); based on first principal component of six (standard-
ized) sentiment proxies over 1966-2005 data. 
Baker and 
Wurgler 
SOX 1 if trade is executed after August 28, 2002, zero otherwise IFDF 




StakeDecile Decile of the Stake traded in the transaction of all sample 
transactions, ranging between 1 (lowest) and 10 (highest) 
IFDF/ 
CRSP 
StockTercile Tercile of the firm's stock return in the previous calendar 
month of all sample firms’ stock returns, ranging from 1 
(lowest) to 3 (highest) 
CRSP 
TradeDuration The volume weighted number of days between the first and 
the last transaction of a transaction sequence 
IFDF 
Trading A dummy variable, equal to 1 on days, when an insider 
trades, and 0 otherwise 
IFDF 
Turnover Total number of shares traded on the transaction day / total 
number of shares outstanding 
CRSP 
Volatility Annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns over 
the preceding calendar month 
CRSP 
Volume Value of the transaction in thousand $ IFDF 
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Appendix B: A model of simultaneous trading by multiple insiders 
Consider a highly simplified model of a market with I insiders indexed 1,...,  i I and two 
periods 1,2t . Each insider i wishes to sell a block of Q
i
 shares over the two periods and we 
denote by i
tq  the quantity sold by insider i in period t. The number of shares each insider in-
tends to trade is identical, so that the game is entirely symmetric. The fundamental value of 
the shares is 0p  in both periods, but market makers respond to trades by adjusting the price, 
which may deviate from the fundamental value. We adopt the terminology of Bessembinder, 
Carrion, Tuttle and Venkataraman (2016) and define price impact as temporary and short-
lived if it lasts only for one period, the execution period. Similarly, price impact is temporary 
and long-lived it if lasts for two periods. We follow the literature and simply assume a price-
impact function, which is not derived from first principles.
15
 
Price formation. The price of the shares in period t is established as a function of the quantity 
traded by all insiders at that point: 
(2) 





      
i I i I i I
i i i
i i i
p p q p p q q    
Hence, the price process includes one-period (“short-lived”) as well as two-period (“long-
lived”) temporary price impact. There is no permanent price impact, i.e. trades do not affect 
the fundamental value 𝑝0. The parameter , which determines the impact of trading in period 
1 on the price in period 2 corresponds to the resiliency parameter in Bessembinder, Carrion, 
Tuttle and Venkataraman (2016) and measures the long-lived temporary price impact beyond 
the period in which the trade is executed. The price-impact function relies on the following 
assumptions: 
1. There is a sufficient ex-ante possibility that some market participants are informed, so 
that market makers expect informed trades and react with longer-term changes in the 
stock price. 
2. Trading is anonymous and can therefore have a long-lived price impact for uninformed 
trades until the market learns that these trades were, in fact, uninformed. Only then will 
the stock price revert back to the fundamental value 0p . In our model this happens after 
period 2. Effectively, we assume that the market cannot resolve until after period 2 
whether trades in period 1 should be attributed to informational or to liquidity reasons.  
3. Insiders have no information and their trades are therefore not related to changes in 
fundamental value and they do not compete for the use of private information. Insiders 
                                                          
15
 Models that analyze optimal strategies to trade large blocks usually employ price impact functions that fea-
ture some combination of temporary price changes attributable to microstructure reasons and permanent price 
changes attributable to changes in the fundamental value of the stock. See Almgren and Chriss (2001), 
Bessembinder, Carrion, Tuttle and Venkataraman (2016), Huberman and Stanzl (2005) and Schied and 
Schöneborn (2009). Bertsimas and Lo (1998) assume a pricing rule for which the price impact of trades is 
permanent. 
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can wait until all long-lived temporary price impact has faded and value all shares they 
do not sell and hold until the terminal period at the shares’ fundamental value 0p . 
The pricing rule resembles that of a call auction more than of a continuous market. This as-
sumption rules out the possibility that an insider gains an advantage by trading slightly ahead 
of other insiders and thereby avoids the price impact induced by other traders. The fundamen-
tal value and the slope parameters are common knowledge. 
Insiders’ objective. Each insider maximizes the following objective: 
(3)    
2
1 1 2 2 0 1 2 1 2 .
2
      i i i i i ip q p q p Q q q Q q q

 
The objective builds on prior literature.
16
 The first two terms of the objective represent trading 
revenues across the two periods, 
1 1 2 2
i ip q p q . After the two trading rounds insider i has 
1 2 
i iQ q q  shares left, which have a fundamental value 0p , so the third term represents the 
fundamental value of her remaining shares after the two periods and after the stock price has 
reverted to its fundamental value. Finally, we add a penalty term, which introduces the notion 
that insiders have some urgency to trade, which may be motivated by risk considerations. In a 
richer model with uncertainty about the fundamental value, such a risk-premium would result 
if insiders are risk averse and exposed to the uncertainty about the long-term fundamental 
value of the shares after the two trading periods.
17
 In such a context, the parameter   would 
reflect the product of the variance of the long-term fundamental value and insiders' risk aver-
sion. We therefore assume that insiders bear a cost proportional to the square of the number of 
shares they still own after the two trading periods. We do not introduce a penalty for the stock 
insiders hold after the first period, but sell in the second period. This simplification has the 









t tj j i
Q q the quantity traded by traders other than trader i in period t and 
restate the objective by inserting the definition for  tp from (2) into (3): 
(4) 
       
   
0 1 0 2
2
0
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
1 2 1 2 .
2
       
    


i i i i i i i i
i i i i
p q Q q p q Q q Q q
p Q q q Q q q

  
                                                          
16
 E.g., Huberman and Stanzl (2005). 
17
 Almgren and Chriss (2001) and Huberman and Stanzl (2005) use a mean-variance framework, whereas 
Schied and Schöneborn (2009) analyze an expected-utility model. Some authors employ a mean-standard de-
viation framework in order to embed the question in a value-at-risk framework, see e.g., Hisata and Yamai 
(2000) and Dubil (2002). Grossman and Miller (1988) and Vayanos (2001) endogenize price impact and as-
sume an exponential utility function and normal distributions, which implies mean-variance behavior and is 
therefore similar. 
18
 We considered an alternative specification with a penalty for shares held after the first period and an addi-
tional penalty for shares held after the second period. Our conclusions are unchanged but the mathematical 
derivations become significantly more complex. 
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The first order conditions for maximizing this objective with respect to the quantity i
tq  traded 




1 1 1 1 2
2 2 2 2
0 0 1 2





      
  

   
i i i
i i
p Q q p Q q q






Of particular interest for us is the solution for 
1
iq , the quantity traded in period 1, from solving 
the system of equations (5): 
(6)   
     
 
2 1 1 2
1




    

 
i i iQ Q Q
q
        
    
 
Hence, the response of insider i to the contemporaneous trades of others, 
1
iQ is negative and 
depends only on the short-lived price impact 
1 , but not on long-lived price impact . The 
contemporaneous trades of other traders, 
1
iQ , have no influence on how long-lived price im-
pact influences current trading decisions. The influence of 
1
iQ  works only through short-lived 
price impact 
1 . 
From symmetry, we have that the quantities traded by all insiders are the same. We can there-
fore drop the superscript I and use i
t tq q  and 
iQ Q  for all i and t. To simplify, let 
  11 1
ii I qQ   , and express the first order conditions as: 
(7) 
   
   






I q Q q q





     
 

   
 
Upon solving, we obtain: 
(8) 
   
   
2
1
1 2 1 2
1
2
















    
 

    


   


   

 
Observe that the quantities traded in both periods increase in  , which is consistent with our 
interpretation of   as a parameter that measures insiders' urgency to trade. 
Liquidity timing. The number of shares traded in period t decreases in t , i.e., it decreases if 
the market at time t becomes less liquid. This is intuitive because illiquidity is expensive for 
insiders, so they will either trade in the more liquid period or not trade at all if trading be-
comes more costly. Also, the number of shares traded in period t increases in the slope of the 
pricing function in the other period, i.e., insiders trade more in period 1 if the market at t = 2 
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becomes less liquid. Hence, insiders trade more in the period in which the market is more liq-
uid. This is the liquidity timing effect to which we refer in the text.  
Long-lived price impact is modeled here with the parameter . It measures the (lack of) resili-
ence of the market in the terminology of Bessembinder, Carrion, Tuttle and Venkataraman 
(2016). If  becomes larger, then the impact of trading in period 1 on prices in period 2 in-
creases. Higher temporary long-lived price impact induces insiders to shift their trades from 
period 1 to period 2, which is intuitive: if temporary long-lived price impact increases, insid-
ers trade more cautiously at the beginning in order not to move future prices against them-
selves. Hence, higher temporary long-lived price impact increases the cost of immediacy, be-
cause with long-lived price impact, trading today has not only short-term costs, but also long-
term costs. 
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Appendix C: Additional tables (not for publication) 
 
Table A1: Existence of trade sequences 
Panel A: Univariate analysis 
This table displays the percentage of transactions that are followed by a transaction in the same direction (sepa-
rated for purchases and sales). Please note that the total number of transactions is reduced and the percentage of 
sales is different compared to the original sample because the first transaction of each individual insider in each 
firm can only be used as benchmark for the next transaction by the insider in the respective firm. The Chi²-test 
on independence and the Fisher exact test are based on the contingency table expressing the relationship between 
sales and purchases conditional on the prior direction of trade. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Observations All without 
first for each 
person 
Only within 
183 days of 
each other 
Only within 
40 days of 
each other 
Only within 2 




Same Direction     
     Sales 98.78% 99.75% 99.89% 99.98% 
     Purchases 96.75% 99.00% 99.53% 99.89% 
% Sales / Total 81.43% 82.24% 82.95% 85.31% 
# of observations 1,727,012 1,612,035 1,511,706 1,268,502 
Chi²-test (p-value) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Fisher exact test (p-value) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 
Panel B: Probit regressions 
The table presents results for Probit regressions with Purchase as the dependent variable. See Appendix A for a 
definition of all variables. For each independent variable, the table displays the marginal effects (evaluated at the 
mean of the independent variables) and in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided t-test for a coefficient 
equal to zero. In all regressions, t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Additionally, 
we report McFadden’s R² and the p-values of the F-test with the null-hypothesis of the coefficient of LagPur-
chase being equal to its unconditional mean. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LagPurchase 0.9400 0.9273 0.9373 0.9398 0.9249 
 (800.32) (645.32) (767.59) (798.47) (620.80) 
Sentiment  0.0187   0.0169 
  (30.12)   (28.56) 
StockTercile   -0.0268  -0.0343 
   (-92.29)  (-73.36) 
RunupCAR    -0.0061 0.0103 
       (-3.91) (4.89) 
Observations 1,727,012 1,016,682 1,726,953 1,719,955 1,010,552 
Pseudo R² 0.844 0.824 0.850 0.844 0.829 
LagPurchase =0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
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Table A2: Trade duration: Sample splits  
This table presents results for OLS regressions with LogTradeDuration as the dependent variable. Panel A re-
ports results  separately for purchases and sales, and Panel B separately for pre- and post-SOX periods. The defi-
nition of Informed in Columns (1) and (2) is based on earnings announcements. An insider trade is classified as 
informed if it takes place within 28 days before an earnings announcement. Columns (3) and (4) report results 
for the definition of Informed, based on M&A announcements.  An insider trade is classified as informed if it 
takes place in a target firm within 28 days before an M&A announcement. Columns (5) and (6) report results for 
the definition of Informed, based on event study returns, and Columns (7) and (8) for the definition of Informed 
following Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski (2012) for the subsample where it is available. See Appendix A for a 
definition of all variables. For each independent variable, the table displays the slope estimate and, in parenthe-
ses, the t-statistic of the two-sided t-test for the null-hypothesis that the respective coefficient equals zero. Stand-
ard errors allow for clustering at the firm level. All regressions include calendar year dummies, industry dum-
mies, and dummies for each stake decile. 
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Panel A: Purchases vs. sales  
 
  LogTradeDuration 


































MultipleInsiders 0.0065 0.0211 0.0056 0.0207 0.0067 0.0217 0.0168 0.0346 
 (3.77) (10.48) (3.02) (10.65) (3.32) (11.98) (2.01) (8.50) 
Informed -0.0028 0.0322 -0.0003 -0.0042 -0.0139 -0.0072 -0.0409 -0.0461 
 (-0.65) (8.67) (-0.01) (-0.12) (-5.23) (-1.70) (-3.34) (-5.67) 
MultipleInsiders -0.0073 -0.0031 -0.0037 -0.0188 -0.0069 -0.0090 -0.0139 -0.0056 
*Informed (-2.01) (-0.73) (-0.14) (-0.63) (-2.37) (-1.58) (-1.60) (-1.34) 
Volatility -0.0111 -0.0040 -0.0110 -0.0058 -0.0102 -0.0053 -0.0201 -0.0107 




LongSide 0.0086 0.0414 0.0088 0.0417 0.0084 0.0418 0.0104 0.0277 
 (3.21) (15.66) (3.24) (15.87) (3.10) (16.05) (1.17) (5.75) 
Amihud 0.0473 0.0675 0.0474 0.0671 0.0474 0.0670 0.0642 0.0573 
 




Chairperson 0.0097 0.0404 0.0096 0.0404 0.0092 0.0404 0.0032 0.0425 
 
(0.71) (2.72) (0.71) (2.70) (0.68) (2.70) (0.09) (1.47) 
Officer -0.0351 -0.0384 -0.0350 -0.0403 -0.0348 -0.0404 -0.0275 -0.0289 
 
(-7.74) (-5.08) (-7.74) (-5.35) (-7.71) (-5.38) (-1.93) (-2.65) 
Director -0.0414 -0.0077 -0.0416 -0.0091 -0.0418 -0.0092 -0.0324 0.0227 
 
(-8.71) (-1.00) (-8.74) (-1.19) (-8.80) (-1.20) (-2.55) (1.70) 
Other 0.1443 0.0851 0.1437 0.0861 0.1426 0.0861 0.1393 0.1270 







 LogMarketCap 0.0309 0.0194 0.0309 0.0190 0.0311 0.0190 0.0339 0.0162 
 
(20.40) (13.02) (20.46) (12.71) (20.57) (12.77) (8.06) (5.08) 
SOX -0.0218 -0.0218 -0.0221 -0.0229 -0.0217 -0.0222 -0.0784 -0.0451 
 
(-2.16) (-1.86) (-2.19) (-1.96) (-2.16) (-1.90) (-3.35) (-2.67) 
 Observations 129,016 291,798 129,016 291,798 129,016 291,798 11,225 54,494 
 R² 0.348 0.249 0.347 0.248 0.348 0.248 0.408 0.280 
 Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 StakeDecile FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Panel B: Pre- vs. post-SOX  
 
  LogTradeDuration 






































MultipleInsiders 0.0160 0.0145 0.0150 0.0140 0.0166 0.0146 0.0297 0.0323 
 (7.56) (9.34) (7.26) (9.35) (8.30) (8.72) (3.71) (7.37) 
Informed 0.0159 0.0309 -0.0355 0.0171 0.0023 -0.0213 -0.0586 -0.0402 
 (4.31) (7.17) (-0.81) (0.45) (0.60) (-8.34) (-4.40) (-5.10) 
MultipleInsiders -0.0098 -0.0058 0.0788 -0.0393 -0.0117 -0.0057 -0.0014 -0.0135 
*Informed (-2.10) (-1.70) (0.70) (-2.16) (-2.37) (-1.82) (-0.17) (-2.85) 
Volatility -0.0007 -0.0190 -0.0010 -0.0208 -0.0010 -0.0190 -0.0103 -0.0123 




LongSide 0.0367 0.0256 0.0368 0.0259 0.0369 0.0259 0.0425 0.0200 
 (13.19) (9.79) (13.21) (9.99) (13.37) (10.02) (4.38) (4.64) 
Amihud 0.0399 0.0559 0.0400 0.0560 0.0399 0.0555 0.0466 0.0600 
 




Chairperson 0.0250 0.0373 0.0252 0.0375 0.0251 0.0375 0.0587 0.0028 
 
(1.98) (2.28) (1.98) (2.28) (1.97) (2.29) (1.77) (0.12) 
Officer -0.0382 -0.0375 -0.0385 -0.0390 -0.0385 -0.0391 -0.0376 -0.0324 
 
(-7.72) (-4.40) (-7.78) (-4.55) (-7.80) (-4.60) (-2.47) (-3.01) 
Director -0.0261 -0.0132 -0.0262 -0.0146 -0.0262 -0.0149 0.0102 0.0075 
 
(-5.00) (-1.64) (-5.01) (-1.80) (-5.02) (-1.86) (0.62) (0.60) 
Other 0.1148 0.1154 0.1153 0.1168 0.1150 0.1161 0.0805 0.1619 







 LogMarketCap 0.0276 0.0171 0.0276 0.0168 0.0276 0.0168 0.0232 0.0201 
 
(20.47) (9.80) (20.50) (9.59) (20.55) (9.62) (6.30) (6.17) 
Purchase 0.0211 0.0013 0.0209 -0.0003 0.0210 0.0027 0.0241 0.0170 
  (4.60) (0.26) (4.54) (-0.05) (4.58) (0.54) (1.59) (1.38) 
  Observations 205,406 215,408 205,406 215,408 205,406 215,408 15,281 50,438 
  R² 0.282 0.264 0.282 0.263 0.282 0.264 0.323 0.289 
 Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 StakeDecile FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A3: Trade Duration: Additional Robustness Checks (1) 
This table repeats the analysis of Table 4 of the paper with LogTradeDuration as the dependent variable. Results 
for three alternative definitions of a transaction sequence are presented: (1) the maximum length of a transaction 
sequence is limited to 3 days; (2) the maximum length of a transaction sequence is limited to 14 days; (3) the 
maximum length of a transaction sequence is limited by the disclosure date of its first transaction or 40 days, 
whichever is earlier. Panel A displays results for the definition of Informed based on earnings announcements 
and M&A announcements. Panel B presents results for the definition of Informed, based on event study returns 
and opportunistic trades following Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski (2012) for the subsample where it is available. 
See Appendix A for a definition of all variables. For each independent variable, the table displays the slope esti-
mate and, in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided t-test for the null-hypothesis that the respective coeffi-
cient equals zero. Standard errors allow for clustering at the firm level. All regressions include calendar year 
dummies, industry dummies, and dummies for each stake decile. 
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Definition of Informed: Earnings Announcements M&A Target Insiders 
























MultipleInsiders 0.0064 0.0208 0.0150 0.0060 0.0203 0.0152 
 (8.45) (11.15) (6.97) (7.80) (10.74) (7.20) 
Informed 0.0102 0.0393 0.0152 0.0061 -0.0104 -0.0289 
 (4.89) (9.78) (4.37) (0.34) (-0.36) (-1.33) 
MultipleInsiders -0.0040 -0.0040 0.0028 0.0065 -0.0245 -0.0012 
*Informed (-2.36) (-0.81) (0.54) (0.33) (-1.16) (-0.07) 
Volatility -0.0014 -0.0155 0.0003 -0.0017 -0.0171 -0.0005 




LongSide 0.0170 0.0341 0.0276 0.0170 0.0343 0.0277 
 (9.26) (14.95) (15.79) (9.25) (15.02) (15.85) 
Amihud 0.0188 0.0551 0.0346 0.0187 0.0549 0.0344 
 




Chairperson 0.0071 0.0311 0.0337 0.0072 0.0314 0.0339 
 
(1.08) (2.38) (3.47) (1.08) (2.39) (3.47) 
Officer -0.0339 -0.0452 -0.0253 -0.0343 -0.0463 -0.0257 
 
(-7.84) (-8.87) (-6.12) (-7.88) (-9.03) (-6.15) 
Director -0.0156 -0.0289 -0.0082 -0.0158 -0.0296 -0.0085 
 
(-3.70) (-5.22) (-1.91) (-3.74) (-5.32) (-1.97) 
Other 0.0674 0.1255 0.1085 0.0678 0.1280 0.1096 
 








LogMarketCap 0.0132 0.0262 0.0165 0.0131 0.0258 0.0163 
 
(15.81) (19.54) (15.72) (15.68) (19.32) (15.57) 
SOX -0.0204 -0.0292 -0.1346 -0.0207 -0.0301 -0.1347 
 
(-3.93) (-3.31) (-18.42) (-4.00) (-3.40) (-18.45) 
Purchase 0.0003 0.0163 0.0006 0.0001 0.0157 0.0003 
 
(0.12) (4.00) (0.16) (0.04) (3.80) (0.08) 
  Observations 508,143 372,548 427,269 508,143 372,548 427,269 
  R² 0.189 0.292 0.274 0.189 0.292 0.274 
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Definition of Informed: Event study returns Opportunistic 
























MultipleInsiders 0.0059 0.0219 0.0180 0.0134 0.0432 0.0293 
 (6.36) (11.65) (9.99) (5.05) (8.29) (7.43) 
Informed -0.0063 -0.0100 -0.0009 -0.0208 -0.0602 -0.0245 
 (-3.16) (-3.30) (-0.53) (-3.86) (-6.42) (-3.88) 
MultipleInsiders 0.0007 -0.0116 -0.0109 -0.0033 -0.0156 -0.0080 
*Informed (0.26) (-2.90) (-7.17) (-1.18) (-3.00) (-1.92) 
Volatility -0.0015 -0.0162 -0.0005 -0.0064 -0.0271 -0.0066 




LongSide 0.0170 0.0343 0.0277 0.0134 0.0306 0.0197 
 (9.24) (15.06) (15.91) (5.00) (6.46) (5.75) 
Amihud 0.0187 0.0546 0.0344 0.0234 0.0685 0.0311 
 




Chairperson 0.0071 0.0313 0.0339 0.0223 0.0363 0.0479 
 
(1.07) (2.38) (3.48) (1.76) (1.38) (2.92) 
Officer -0.0343 -0.0463 -0.0258 -0.0265 -0.0265 -0.0142 
 
(-7.88) (-9.02) (-6.17) (-4.26) (-2.43) (-2.35) 
Director -0.0158 -0.0296 -0.0084 0.0069 0.0148 0.0208 
 
(-3.74) (-5.33) (-1.96) (0.87) (1.11) (2.58) 
Other 0.0678 0.1277 0.1095 0.0810 0.1562 0.1043 
 








LogMarketCap 0.0131 0.0259 0.0162 0.0119 0.0238 0.0106 
 
(15.72) (19.39) (15.63) (5.71) (7.79) (4.81) 
SOX -0.0206 -0.0294 -0.1341 -0.0349 -0.0602 -0.1856 
 
(-3.96) (-3.33) (-18.62) (-3.91) (-3.87) (-12.04) 
Purchase 0.0004 0.0170 0.0011 0.0096 0.0241 0.0034 
 
(0.16) (4.10) (0.29) (1.29) (1.98) (0.41) 
  Observations 508,143 372,548 427,269 78,720 56,512 73,179 
  R² 0.189 0.292 0.275 0.204 0.312 0.273 
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Table A4: Trade Duration: Additional Robustness Checks (2) 
The table presents results for OLS regressions with LogTradeDuration as the dependent variable. Columns (1) to 
(3) present results for three alternative definition of Informed based on event study returns: (1) Informed is based 
on a longer disclosure 6-day window, CAR(D,D+5), (2) a 6-day window around the trading date, CAR(T,T+5), 
and (3) the CAR between the trading date and one day after the disclosure date, CAR(T,D+1), instead of the 2-
day benchmark definition. In columns (4) and (5), Informed is 1 for all opportunistic trades that happen in isolat-
ed months (Isolated), according to the classification of Cicero and Wintoki (2014), and 0 otherwise. Column (6) 
also includes a measure for long-lived private information, LongLived. Following Cicero and Wintoki (2014) 
this variable is 1 for all opportunistic trades that spread over multiple consecutive months (sequenced trades), 
and 0 otherwise. See Appendix A for a definition of all variables. For each independent variable, the table dis-
plays the slope estimate and, in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided t-test for the null-hypothesis that the 
respective coefficient equals zero. Standard errors allow for clustering at the firm level. All regressions include 
calendar year dummies, industry dummies, and dummies for each stake decile. 
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  LogTradeDuration 




















MultipleInsiders 0.0167 0.0156 0.0160 0.0322 0.0302 
 (11.16) (9.47) (9.72) (9.50) (7.09) 
Informed -0.0034 -0.0125 -0.0097 -0.1115 -0.0984 
 (-1.42) (-6.81) (-3.21) (-20.63) (-14.54) 
MultipleInsiders -0.0106 -0.0038 -0.0078 -0.0181 -0.0160 
*Informed (-3.52) (-1.99) (-2.09) (-5.06) (-3.69) 
LongLived        0.0360 
        (3.63) 
MultipleInsiders        0.0059 
*LongLived        (1.05) 
Volatility -0.0097 -0.0093 -0.0092 -0.0133 -0.0146 




LongSide 0.0317 0.0319 0.0320 0.0237 0.0249 
 (16.04) (16.11) (16.11) (5.71) (6.06) 
Amihud 0.0433 0.0436 0.0436 0.0507 0.0519 
 




Chairperson 0.0325 0.0325 0.0325 0.0302 0.0324 
 
(2.86) (2.87) (2.86) (1.29) (1.38) 
Officer -0.0393 -0.0393 -0.0392 -0.0174 -0.0168 
 
(-6.86) (-6.85) (-6.82) (-1.92) (-1.85) 
Director -0.0209 -0.0210 -0.0209 0.0172 0.0189 
 
(-3.77) (-3.78) (-3.75) (1.67) (1.83) 
Other 0.1167 0.1168 0.1168 0.1356 0.1377 








LogMarketCap 0.0221 0.0223 0.0223 0.0220 0.0227 
 
(18.88) (18.97) (18.97) (8.47) (8.87) 
SOX -0.0251 -0.0247 -0.0251 -0.0530 -0.0506 
 
(-2.98) (-2.93) (-2.98) (-3.82) (-3.67) 
Purchase 0.0121 0.0124 0.0125 0.0325 0.0332 
  (3.26) (3.34) (3.36) (3.16) (3.23) 
  Observations 420,814 420,814 420,814 65,719 65,719 
  R² 0.271 0.271 0.271 0.312 0.314 
 Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 StakeDecile FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A5: Alternative definition of MultipleInsiders 
This table repeats the analysis of Table 4 of the paper with MultipleInsiders defined as a dummy variable, equal 
to 1 if more than one insider trades on the same day in the same direction, and zero otherwise. For each inde-
pendent variable, the table displays the slope estimate and, in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided t-test 
for the null-hypothesis that the respective coefficient equals zero. Standard errors allow for clustering at the firm 
level. All regressions include calendar year dummies, industry dummies, and dummies for each stake decile. 
  LogTradeDuration 






















MultipleInsiders 0.0534 0.0518 0.0549 0.0643 
 (21.01) (18.65) (18.19) (6.75) 
Informed 0.0251 -0.0076 -0.0083 -0.0488 
 (9.49) (-0.30) (-4.61) (-6.49) 
MultipleInsiders -0.0126 -0.0189 -0.0217 -0.0072 
*Informed (-1.76) (-0.33) (-5.36) (-1.72) 
Volatility -0.0100 -0.0110 -0.0101 -0.0146 




LongSide 0.0323 0.0324 0.0324 0.0264 
 (16.42) (16.53) (16.55) (6.19) 
Amihud 0.0439 0.0438 0.0437 0.0532 
 




Chairperson 0.0335 0.0337 0.0336 0.0341 
 
(2.90) (2.90) (2.89) (1.40) 
Officer -0.0378 -0.0387 -0.0387 -0.0324 
 
(-6.21) (-6.34) (-6.36) (-3.43) 
Director -0.0176 -0.0182 -0.0182 0.0087 
 
(-3.04) (-3.13) (-3.14) (0.80) 
Other 0.1220 0.1233 0.1230 0.1468 








LogMarketCap 0.0222 0.0220 0.0221 0.0209 
 
(18.47) (18.24) (18.31) (7.66) 
SOX -0.0247 -0.0253 -0.0247 -0.0567 
 
(-2.93) (-3.00) (-2.94) (-3.99) 
Purchase 0.0131 0.0126 0.0137 0.0226 
  (3.49) (3.35) (3.63) (2.14) 
  Observations 420,814 420,814 420,814 65,719 
  R² 0.272 0.271 0.272 0.291 
 Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 StakeDecile FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A6: Liquidity Timing: Univariate Analysis 
Panel A: Trading days only 
The table presents results of the univariate test on liquidity timing, based on differences in liquidity on the days 
when insiders trade. Column (1) reports trade-size-weighted mean of the liquidity measure, where the weight of 
each day in the transaction sequence is the proportion of trade, executed on this day. Column (2) reports the 
equally weighted mean of the liquidity measure over all days in the transaction sequence, on which insiders ac-
tually trade. Column (3) reports the ratio of (2) to (1) in percent. Column (4) displays the t-statistic of the two-











% t-statistic N  
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Amihud 0.1271 0.1366 7.5% 45.31 194,302 
EffectiveSpread 0.0156 0.0159 1.9% 13.23 180,040 
Turnover 0.0145 0.0139 -4.1% -28.16 196,675 




Panel B: Trading days vs. non-trading days 
The table presents results of the univariate test on liquidity timing, based on differences in liquidity between 
trading and non-trading days within a sequence. Trading days include days within a transaction sequence when 
an insider actually trades, whereas non-trading days include remaining days in between, up to 20 non-trading 
days before the start of a transaction sequence and up to 20 non-trading days after the end of a transaction se-
quence. Column (1) reports trade-size-weighted mean of the liquidity measure, where the weight of each day in 
the transaction sequence is the proportion of trade, executed on this day. Column (2) reports equally-weighted 
mean of the liquidity measure over all days in the transaction sequence, on which insiders actually trade. Column 
(3) reports the ratio of (2) to (1) in percent. Column (4) displays the t-statistic of the two-sided t-test on the 











% t-statistic N  
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Amihud 0.1351 0.3386 150.6% -119.94 193,218 
EffectiveSpread 0.0159 0.0293 84.3% -148.03 179,603 
Turnover 0.0117 0.0091 -22.2% 127.97 193,226 
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Table A7: Liquidity timing: Determinants of stake traded 
Panel A: Levels 
The table presents results for OLS regressions with the number of shares traded by an insider on a particular day 
divided by the total number of shares outstanding (Stake) in percent as the dependent variable. Regressions in-
clude all non-trading days within a transaction sequence as well as up to 20 non-trading days before the first 
trading day in a sequence and up to 20 non-trading days after the last trading day in a sequence. The dependent 
variable (Stake) equals zero for non-trading days. The header of the table reports the liquidity measure used for 
each column. Coefficients for each of the liquidity measures are reported in the line Liquidity Measure. See Ap-
pendix A for a definition of all variables. For each independent variable, the table displays the slope estimate 
and, in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided t-test for the null-hypothesis that the respective coefficient 
equals zero. Standard errors allow for clustering at the firm level. All regressions include calendar month dum-
mies, weekday dummies and firm-fixed effects. 








  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LagStake 0.2053 0.2072 0.2024 0.2059 
 (8.86) (8.01) (8.55) (7.91) 
Liquidity Measure -0.0017 -0.03047 0.7061 -0.0249 
 (-23.73) (-23.86) (21.33) (-17.40) 
Absolute return 
 
0.0953 0.0260 0.0978 
 
 
(5.14) (1.68) (5.35) 
% change in market volume 0.0017 -0.0001 -0.0037 0.0000 
 (4.40) (-0.13) (-7.83) (-0.01) 
BeforeEarn -0.0019 -0.0020 -0.0021 -0.0020 
 (-13.97) (-15.62) (-16.14) (-15.61) 
AfterEarn 0.0029 0.0028 0.0015 0.0029 
 (12.83) (10.65) (6.58) (10.83) 
Observations 7,109,356 6,265,385 7,210,819 6,367,313 
R² 0.055 0.057 0.059 0.056 
Calendar month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week day FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Panel B: Differences 
The table presents results for OLS regressions with the difference in the number of shares traded by an insider on 
a particular day from the number of shares traded on the previous day, divided by the total number of shares out-
standing, D.Stake (in percent), as the dependent variable. Regressions include all non-trading days within a 
transaction sequence as well as up to 20 non-trading days before the first trading day in a sequence and up to 20 
non-trading days after the last trading day in a sequence. The header of the table reports the liquidity measure 
used for each column. Coefficients for the first differences of each of the liquidity measures are reported in the 
line  liquidity measure. See Appendix A for a definition of all variables. For each independent variable, the 
table displays the slope estimate and, in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided t-test for the null-hypothesis 
that the respective coefficient equals zero. Standard errors allow for clustering at the firm level. All regressions 
include calendar month dummies and weekday dummies. 








  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 liquidity measure -0.0016 -0.0277 1.2506 -0.0198 
 (-21.40) (-17.59) (22.66) (-9.00) 
 absolute return  0.0554 -0.0452 0.0585 
  (9.69) (-8.65) (10.36) 
% change in market volume 0.0015 0.0008 -0.0036 0.0009 
 (3.62) (1.85) (-7.94) (2.18) 
BeforeEarn 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0008 0.0001 
 (0.52) (1.13) (-7.52) (0.85) 
AfterEarn 0.0006 0.0007 0.0014 0.0006 
 (8.05) (8.29) (17.15) (7.92) 
Observations 7,041,608 6,065,466 7,210,642 6,207,586 
R² 0.002 0.001 0.007 0.001 
Calendar month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week day FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Panel C: Stake/Turnover below median 
The table presents results for OLS regressions with the number of shares traded by an insider on a particular day 
divided by the total number of shares outstanding (Stake) in percent as the dependent variable. The sample in-
cludes only days, on which insiders actually trade. The table displays results for insider trades, for which stake 
traded, scaled by the daily turnover of the stock, (Stake/Turnover) is below the median of the whole sample. The 
header of the table reports the liquidity measure used for each column. Coefficients for each of the liquidity 
measures are reported in the line Liquidity measure. See Appendix A for a definition of all variables. For each 
independent variable, the table displays the slope estimate and, in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided t-
test for the null-hypothesis that the respective coefficient equals zero. Standard errors allow for clustering at the 
firm level. All regressions include calendar month dummies, weekday dummies, and firm-fixed effects. 








  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LagStake 0.0434 0.0416 0.0343 0.0418 
 (8.16) (7.28) (7.43) (7.30) 
Liquidity measure -0.0115 -0.02905 0.9872 -0.0080 
 (-14.39) (-6.85) (35.65) (-1.94) 
Absolute return 
 
0.1233 0.0136 0.1228 
 
 
(21.29) (3.04) (21.06) 
% change in market volume 0.0064 0.0037 -0.0030 0.0037 
 (10.45) (5.98) (-5.26) (5.99) 
BeforeEarn -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0006 
 (-0.19) (-1.24) (-1.89) (-1.29) 
AfterEarn 0.0021 0.0022 0.0005 0.0022 
 (7.92) (8.13) (2.26) (8.07) 
Observations 228,639 208,674 228,639 208,960 
R² 0.311 0.336 0.434 0.335 
Calendar month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week day FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
